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PROCUREMENT 
POLICIES AND 
PRACTICES OF DAIRY 
MANUFACTURING PLANTS 
IN EASTERN SOUTH DAKOTA 
Part I. Market Structure and Behavior 
ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT 
AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENT STATION 
SOUTH DA KOT A ST ATE COLLEGE, BROOKINGS 
U. 5. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, COOPERATING 
This is the first of two reports 
concerning the results of a project 
entitled "A Study of Managerial 
Decision Making and Procurement 
Policies in Selected South Dakota 
Dairy Plants." The second report 
will be on managerial decision 
making. The study was conducted 
by South Dakota State College 
Agricultural Experiment Station 
under a Research and Marketing 
Act contract for the United States 
Department of Agriculture. 
The authors are indebted to Dr. 
Louis F. Herrmann, of the United 
States Department of Agriculture, 
for help and guidance in organiz­
ing and conducting the study; to 
Dr. Ragnar L. Kristjanson, former 
Associate Economist at South Da­
kota State College, for encourage­
ment and advice in organizing the 
study; and to Dr. Carl Wilson, for­
mer Associate Professor of Speech, 
South Dakota State College, for 
his able assistance in the survey 
of the literature and construction 
of the questionnaire. 
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PROCUREMENT POLICIES 
and PRACTICES oJ DAIRY 
MANUFACTURING PLANTS 
in eastern South Dakota 
Part I. Market Structure and Behavior 
By RALPH E. NELSON and TRAVIS W. MANNING1 · 
INTRODUCTION 
The procurement policies and practices of dairy manufacturing plants significantly influence the efficiency of the dairy marketing system. The strategic and tactical decisions of plant managers in pol­icy formation and choice of prac­tices are related to the competi­tive structure of the market. Mar­ket structure, then, affects market performance through its influence on managerial decisions. A better understanding of marketing struc­ture and managerial decision mak­ing should contribute to the im­provement of marketing efficiency. The nature of competition--the market structure and market be­havior--in milk and cream procure­ment by d a i r y manufacturing plants in Eastern South Dakota affects several groups. Producers have a vital interest in the way the dairy marketing system performs its functions, both in terms of oper­ating and pricing efficiency. The 
3 
processing and marketing costs af­fect the share of the consumer dollar that accrues to the producer. Consumers also have a vital inter­est in the way the dairy marketing system performs its functions. The price, choice, quality, and avail­ability of dairy products are de­termined by the performance of the dairy marketing syste_m. . The dairy marketing system in South Dakota has been undergo­ing rapid changes during the past three decades. The major changes are: (1) milk production has been declining and in 1959 was only 70.0% of milk p r o  d u c t  i o n in the 1926-1930 period, (2) the disposition of milk by producers has been changing and, in 1958, 25.4% of all milk was marketed as whole milk as compared with 8.4% in 1950, (3) the number of dairy manufacturing plants has decreas­ed from 137 in 1933 to 63 in 1958, 
1Assistant Economist and Former Econ­
omist, Agricultural Experiment Station. 
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and (4) the number of cream sta­
tions has decreased from approxi­
mately 1400 in 1933 to 219 in 1959. 
These changes portray a dynamic 
dairy marketing system in which 
new procurement methods are be­
ing tested and adopted. The de­
cisions relative to procurement 
conduct of the plants were made 
within the structural framework of 
the market. 
Nature of the Study 
The working hypothesis of this 
study was that the structure of the 
market influences the conduct of 
the buyers and sellers in the mar­
ket, which in turn influences the 
performance of the market. Eco­
nomic theory suggests some ele­
ments of structure which affect 
conduct and performance. In ad­
dition to the elements suggested 
by theory, each market probably 
has its own peculiar characteris­
tics that influence its behavior. 
This study was concerned with 
the following questions: 
1. What were the structural ele­
ments of the dairy marketing 
system in South Dakota? 
2. What was the conduct of the 
buyers and sellers comprising 
the dairy marketing system in 
South Dakota? 
a. What was the extent of price 
competition? 
b. What was the extent and na­
ture of quasi-price competition? 
c. What was the extent and na­
ture of non-price competition? 
d. How rapidly was new tech­
nology ad�pted? 
e. What unfair procurement 
practices, if any, did the buyers 
feel existed? 
3. What was the performance of 
the market? 
a. How efficient was the mar­
ket in reflecting c o n s u m e r 
wants? 
b. How efficient was the mar­
ket in reflecting p r o d u c e r s 
wants for services? 
c. How efficient was the mar­
keting system in relation to 
known technology? 
d. How progressive was the 
market in the development of 
new technology? 
4. What was the relationship be­
tween the structure of the mar­
ket and (1) the conduct of buy­
ers and sellers, and (2) the per­
formance of the market? 
Source of Data 
This report is based on data col­
lected from 60 dairy plants in 1957 
and 1958, primarily through per­
sonal interviews of managers. All 
of the plants which procured man­
ufacturing milk and cream directly 
from farmers and were located east 
of the Missouri River in South Da­
kota were included in the study. 
Information was obtained concern­
ing the organizational structure of 
plants, products bought and sold, 
management characteristics, pric­
ing policies and practices, procure­
ment service policies and prac­
tices, financial c o n d i t i o n s, and 
amounts of milk and cream han­
dled. Complete information was 
obtained in most but not all cases. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE MARKET 
The term "market", like many 
other terms used in economics, is 
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applied to several concepts. The 
concept which seems most relevant 
to this study concerns price for­
mation and the forces which in­
teract to determine prices. The fol­
lowing definition seems suitable 
for the purposes of this study: A 
inarket is a sphere in which the 
forces of supply and demand inter­
act and the terms of trade are es­
tablished for a product and its 
substitutes. "Sphere" is used in a 
general sense and includes the 
full range of supply and demand 
forces influencing the terms of 
trade. The "terms of trade" include 
price and other considerations of 
value that are involved in a trans­
action. A "product" denotes a goods 
or service produced and sold by a 
single seller. The market, in its 
most complete sense, includes all 
stages in the marketing process 
from initial producer to final con­
sumer; but to avoid undue compli­
cation, the market may be treated 
as a single stage in the marketing 
channel.2 
Market Delineation 
An important but often neglect­
ed task in market structure analy­
sis is the delineation of the sphere 
in which the forces of supply and 
demand interact and the terms of 
trade are established for a product 
and its substitutes. Markets have 
traditionally been identified along 
commodity or industry lines. Stud­
ies of industrial concentration have 
followed this approach and often 
have misinterpreted the nature of 
competition within a market be­
cause the substitutability between 
products classified in different "in­
dustries" has been ignored. The 
market for a product includes all 
of its relevant substitutes. A major 
task in delineating the market for 
a product is the identification of 
the relevant substitutes. All pro­
ducts are substitutes in some con­
texts. The relevant substitutes in 
the present context are those whose 
exchange may affect the supply of 
or demand for-thence, the rela­
tive terms of trade for--the product 
under consideration. Inasmuch as 
products and sellers are paired 
under the market definition used 
in this study, the identification of 
the seller group is made simultane-
2Most discussions of price formation and 
market relationships assume a simplified 
one- or two-stage marketing process. In 
the one-stage process the initial producer 
sells directly to the ultimate consumer. In 
the two-stage process an intermediary 
buys productive resources from the initial 
producer, combines them into finished 
products which it sells to the final con­
sumer. Some discussions treat the two 
stages as separate markets-one a "factor" 
market, the other a "product" market. A 
three- or multiple-stage market is gen­
erally conceded to prevail in reality but 
it has not been adequately treated in 
many theoretical formulations. The dis­
cussions of three-stage markets often treat 
the stages separately, concentrating their 
attention upon the intermediate ( or "in­
dustrial" market) stage. The treatment 
of vertical segments or stages as separate 
and independent markets poses some 
grave dangers and it is tantamount to an 
assumption of complete vertical inte­
gration. Separate theoretical treatment of 
factor, industrial, and product markets 
can be justified on the basis of avoiding 
hopeless complications, provided that 
the inter-relationships between stages are 
properly recognized. The danger of over­
simplification lies chiefly in the empiri­
cal application of the theory. 
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ously with that of the group of 
substitutes. The buyer group, in 
turn, may be identified in terms of 
the demand functions for the prod­
uct and its substitutes. The market 
for a product, then, includes all oth­
er products for which it is substitu­
table, all sellers who would be will­
ing to sell the substitutes, and all 
buyers who would be willing. to buy 
the product, within the relevant 
range of relative terms of trade. 
The relevant range may be de­
fined in terms of "normal" or prob­
able relative prices, services, and 
other terms involved in exchange. 
The substitutes for a given prod­
uct may be identified by means 
of a · mutatis mutandis cross de­
mand function which may be cal­
led "cross influence" to avoid con­
fusion with the more common 
ceteris paribus variety of cross de­
mand. 3 This function measures the 
full range of substitution effects, 
including the indirect influences 
of spatially separated sellers. A 
ceteris paribus cross d e m a n d 
function reflects only direct in­
fluences. It does not measure the 
indirect influences which are re­
layed through chains and networks 
of spatially separated sellers. It im­
plicity assumes either a point mar­
ket in which all buyers and sellers 
have some mutual relationships or 
an areal market in which no price 
influences are relayed.4 
The market group identified in 
terms of positive cross influence 
of demand schedules includes all 
direct and indirect rivals of a given 
seller and takes into account spa­
tial separation of buyers and sellers 
which is a common characteristic. 
For example, sellers h and i may 
be direct rivals because of over­
lapping sales territories for substi­
tute products. Likewise seller j may 
be a direct rival of i but not of h 
because their sales territories do 
not overlap. (Figure 1). A price 
cut by h may cause i to retaliate, 
thus reducing the demand for the 
product of j. Demand influences 
may be transmitted from h to j as 
readily as if they were direct ri­
vals. Such chain relationships may 
form a network of overlapping and 
interlocking direct rivalry groups. 
Each seller in the network is a ri­
val, direct or indirect, of every 
other seller. This system would be 
3A price cross-demand function states the 
relation of the quantity demanded of the 
product of one seller to the price of the 
product of another seller, with all tastes, 
preferences, incomes, and technology re­
maining constant. The mutatis mutandis 
and ceteris paribus type functions differ 
in that the former assumes all other sel­
lers to have adjusted fully to each price 
change while the latter assumes all other 
prices held constant. 
The use of cross-demand and cross­
supply functions in market delineation 
has been proposed by several writers in­
cluding Papandreou and Wheeler ( 15, 
pp. 20-21), Cochrane (7, pp. 22-26), 
and Evans ( 8, pp. 11-13). 
4Jt has been pointed out by Bishop that, 
"In oligopolistic cases, of course, neither 
of these ( other prices or other quantities) 
ceteris paribus concepts is even approxi­
mately 'realistic', since oligopolistic in­
terdependence implies that other firms 
typically will readjust their prices and 
quantities in response to a price-quantity 
move by the i th firm," ( 2, p. 781). How­
ever, he did not pursue the implications 
of a mutatis mutandis cross-demand 
function because he was interested in 
market classification rather than market 
delineation. 
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/ �-
h J .... 
h, i, and j Individual sellers 
----- Direct rivalry (positive cross 
influence and positive cross 
demand) 
- - - - - - - - - - Indirect rivalry (positive 
cross influence and no cross 
demand) 
Figure 1. 
identified as a single market group 
by cross influence whereas it would 
be identified as a number of over­
lapping market groups by a cete­
ris paribus cross deinand. The 
latter cannot account for the de­
mand influences which are trans­
mitted from one rivalry group to 
another by sellers which are mem­
bers of both. Consequently, it stops 
short of defining the market broad­
ly enough to include all the forces 
interacting to determine the terms 
of trade. 
The nature of cross influence of 
demand is as follows: If the cross­
influence curve relating the prod­
ucts sold by two sellers is constant 
(a horizontal line) the two prod­
ucts are independent of each other 
and the sellers are not in the same 
market. If the curve is not hori­
zontal the sellers are in the same 
market and are subject to common 
forces of demand. Their products 
are substitutes if the cross influ­
ence curve slopes generally up­
ward and to the right and are com­
plements if the curve slopes down­
ward and to the right. 
For cross influence of supply, 
the converse is true. If the cross 
influence of supply curve between 
plant A as a buyer and any other 
plant is non-constant they are in 
the same market group; and if it 
is sloping generally downward and 
to the right, their relationship is 
competitive. 
The delineation of the market 
group of buyers can be accom­
plished by identifying substitutable 
products through the use of cross 
influence of supply. In using the 
cross influence concept it is neces­
sary to select an anchor plant as a 
starting point. 5 Assume that plant 
A is the anchor plant and has four 
direct rivals - plants B1 , B2, B3 , 
and B4 (Figure 2). Each plant B has 
four direct rivals which includes 
plant A and three C plants. Further 
assume that: (1) the short run sup­
ply of milk is completely inelastic, 
(2) transfer costs are a simple lin­
ear function of distance, (3) the 
cross elasticity of supply between 
each plant and its direct rivals is 
-2.5, ( 4) the elasticity of supply 
to each plant is + 10, (5) each 
plant attempts to maintain its vol­
ume of butterfat receipts, and (6) 
each plant has the same volume of 
� The word "plant" was used instead of 
"firm" whenever reference was made to 
the dairy industry. This was done because 
( 1 ) "plant" is more commonly used in 
the dairy industry when referring to a 
creamery or cheese factory, ( 2 ) this 
evades the controversy of whether a co­
operative is a firm or only an extension 
of the farm firm, and ( 3) two plants in 
the study were owned by large corpo­
rations, so the word "plant" distinguishes 
the individual unit from the parent com­
pany. 
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butterfat receipts. 
Suppose that Plant A increased 
its price by 10%. Each of Plant A's 
direct rivals ( group B plants ) 
would lose 25% of its volume to 
r 
c
f-l -1' 
c,-Bf 
_ f  _l _
c
, 
c, �Bf -c, 
C3 
Hypothetical Location of Dairy 
Manufacturing Plants 
� Cross Elasticity of supply 
Figure 2. 
plant A and plant A's volume would 
double. Each B plant would act 
to maintain volume and would con­
sequently adjust its purchase price 
upward by 2.5%. Each B plant 
would then regain 6.25% of its vol­
ume from plant A and also gain 
18.75% from C plants. The four B 
plants would have now regained 
the volume they originally lost to 
plant A, plant A would have lost 
25% of its initial volume gain, and 
eight C plants would have lost vol­
ume to B plants. Group C plants 
would now act to maintain volume. 
This adjustment-readjustment proc­
ess would continue, as ripples and 
counter-ripples in a pool of water 
in which a pebble has been drop­
ped, until a new equilibrium was 
reached for the entire market 
group. If plant A maintained its 
initial price change, the new equi­
librium would find every plant 
adopting the same proportionate 
price change as plant A, each 
plant would have the same volume 
as the status quo ante, and the 
profit of each plant would be low­
er. The same response relationship 
would be valid if plant A had 
maintained price and increased 
its service. There would, however, 
be a greater time lag in response 
to a change in service as will be 
discussed later in this report. 
The same response relationship 
would be valid using various as­
sumptions about individual plant 
behavior. Plants may act to main­
tain volume as illustrated, maximize 
profit, match price or match ser­
vice changes of any of their rivals, 
without affecting the nature of the 
conclusion. Only if the direct rivals 
made no response to the initial 
change (which is highly unlikely 
if the cross supply is negative) 
would the indirect rivals remain 
unaffected. 
Each buyer in Figure 2 is a ri­
val, direct or indirect, of every 
other buyer. All the buyers are in 
the same market group. 
The market may be delineated 
by identifying all sellers and buy­
ers of substitute products through 
the use of cross influence. This in­
cludes all the forces of supply and 
demand which interact to estab­
lish the terms of trade. 
The use of cross influence could 
result in a rather heterogeneous 
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group of firms in the same market and make an analysis of competi­tive behavior very difficult. In 
empirical investigations, it may be necessary to obtain a relatively ho­mogeneous grouping of firms in order to facilitate analysis and the drawing of generalizations with re­spect to the competitive behavior of the firms involved. Papandreou and Wheeler do this through the concept of an industry ( 15, p. 56 ) .  Cochrane found such a limitation useful in studying agricultural mar­kets ( 7, pp. 21-39 ) .  An industry restriction would be less useful in other markets, such as the market for steel. It would seem preferable to limit the scope of inquiry by means of some minimum cross elasticity figure rather than some technical grounds which may be unrelated to the closeness of com­pe:iti:e relationships. A n y  re­stnct10n of the unit of study to a group smaller than the market re­sults in an exclusion of some of the supply and demand forces. This exclusion may be offset, however, by a more detailed analysis and clearer picture of the role of the major forces. The use of an indus­try concept or any other restrictive technique depends on the nature of the market and the purpose of the study. 
Delineati ng the Market 
For Manufacturing Milk and Cream 
.The market for manufacturing milk and cream can be delineated through the use of the cross in­fluence of supply. Assume that plant A represents a dairy manu-
facturing plant buying milk and cream in South Dakota. The rele­vant question is whether plant A can affect the quantities offered 
�or sale to other plants by raising its purchase price. The overlapping of procurement areas of dairy man­ufacturing plants in South Dakota indicated that contiguous plants would have negative cross influ­ences of supply (Figure 3). In many local areas as many as four plants procured milk or cream. Figure 3 shows the procurement areas of 58 of the 60 dairy mami­facturing plants in Eastern South Dakota. It does not show the pro­curement areas of (1) over 200 
?ream buying stations, (2) plants m the surrounding states, and (3) two large centralizers in other states which receive cream by truck and railway from South Da­kota. There was no plant in South Dakota whose procurement area did not overlap at least one other plant. This network probably en­
?ompasses �ost, if not all, plants m. the Umted States which buy milk and cream for manufacturing purposes. The network provides a 
�nech.anism within which a change m pnce or non-price policy by any South Dakota plant could rever­berate until all the plants within the network had been affected. The plants within the network consti­tute the market group. 
A second relevant question is whether the market group includes plants buying milk for fluid con­sumption. Would a change in the purchase price of manufacturing milk by plant A affect the quanti­ty of fluid milk offered for sale to 
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plant Z? There are no restrictions 
against using fluid milk for manu­
facturing purposes but the higher 
cost of producing fluid milk gener­
ally precludes producing it specifi­
cally for the manufacturing milk 
market. Milk produced for fluid milk 
purposes commonly flows into the 
manufacturing milk market when 
its production exceeds consumption. 
The flow, however, is mainly the re­
sult of excess production rather than 
in response to a price change. 
Health regulations generally pro­
hibit the use of manufacturing milk 
for fluid consumption. However, 
some producers of manufacturing 
milk can meet grade A require­
ments and can shift to fluid milk 
whenever there is a buyer for it. 
Again the shift might not be in re­
sponse to a change in price of either 
LEGEND : 
I PLANT 
2 PLANTS _. .... ··· 
3 PLANTS • 
4 PLANTS �111�1 
Figure 3. Overlapping of procurement 
areas of 58 dairy manufacturing plants 
in eastern South Dakota, 1958. 
fluid milk or manufacturing milk. 
Considering the lack of short run 
substitution between fluid milk and 
manufacturing milk in response to 
a change in price of either one, it 
was concluded that cross influence 
between the two was negligible and 
the two products were in different 
markets. However, the relationships 
should be kept in mind and, for 
other studies with different pur­
poses, it might be desirable to in­
clude them in the same market. 
A third relevant question is 
whether buyers of other types of 
farm products fall in the same mar­
ket group as plant A. Assuming a 
long run increasing supply curve 
for milk, farmers will, in the long 
run, divert labor and other re­
sources into dairying from alter­
native enterprises which will affect 
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the quantity of other farm prod­ucts available to firms purchasing these products. Consequently this gives plant A a generally down­ward sloping cross influence curve with buyers of other farm prod-11:cts. However, due to the adjust­ment lag, the degree of influence is definitely weaker than among plants buying manufacturing milk. Because of this gap, buyers of other farm products will not be included in the same market group as plants purchasing manufacturing milk. 
The market group for plant A in­cludes all plants in the United States purchasing milk or cream for manu­facturing purposes. However, this study was limited to the 60 dairy manufacturing plants in Eastern South Dakota. 
Demand Conditions 
The demand for manufacturing milk and cream is derived from consumer demand for manufactur­ed dairy products. A change in consumer demand for dairy prod­ucts is transmitted to producers through the distribution system. The prices of dairy products affect the utilization of available milk at manufacturing plants. W h e n a manufacturing plant has facilities to produce several dairy products, decisions to channel milk into par­ticular dairy products are made at the plant according to the relative price of the various milk products. Producers also make decisions to market their product as milk or cream and in some areas producers can choose among creameries, cheese plants, condenseries, or 
fluid markets in response to changes in the relative price of dairy prod­ucts. 
The total per capita consumption of milk and milk products has been decreasing in the United States since 1940. Using the 1925-29 per· iod as a base, the per capita con· sumption of milk and milk equiva­lent was 101.1% of the base average in 1940, 97.4% in 1945, 91.6% in 1950, and 86.3% in 1959. 
In 1958, butter was the primary dairy product manufactured by 53 of the 60 plants in Eastern South Dakota and 88.2% of the butterfat used for manufacturing purposes in South Dakota was processed in­to butter. The consumption of but­ter, however, has been decreasing. The per capita consumption of but­ter decreased from 18.1 pounds in 1910 to 8 pounds in 1959 ( Table 1 ) .  
Table 1. Per Capita Consumption of 
Butter for Selected Years, United States, 
1910-60 
Year Pounds 
1 9 1 0  ----------------------------------- 1 8  . 1  
1 920 ----------------------------------- 1 4 .6 
19 3 0 ---------------------- ---- -- 17 .3 
1 940 ------------------------------------ 1 6. 7 
1 95 0 ----------------------------------- 1 0  .6 
1 959* ---------------------- - -·-- 8.0 
1 960,jj: ------------------------------------ 7 .8 
*Preliminary estimate. 
The decreased consumption of butter has been the result of the general reduction in consumption of fat-type table spreads and the substitution of margarine for but­ter. The increased use of nonfat milk solids has partially offset the 
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decreased use of butter. However, 
about 50% of the total nonfat milk 
solids was utilized for human con­
sumption in the 1920' s and this 
had increased to 80% by 1957. 
In general, the consumption of 
butter and fluid cream has been 
q.ecreasing while the consumption 
of fluid milk, cheese, and nonfat 
dry milk has been increasing. This 
change in consumption patterns 
for dairy products should increase 
the competitive a d v a n t a g e of 
cheese plants and plants receiving 
whole milk at the expense of plants 
receiving only cream. Also, it is 
expected that the decline in the 
overall consumption of dairy prod­
ucts would discourage new plants 
from entering the market. 
Supply Conditions 
Dairying in South Dakota is con­
centrated largely in the eastern 
part of the state, with the greatest 
concentration in the extreme east­
ern counties; the Missouri River 
acts as a general dividing line be­
tween the dairy and non-dairy 
areas of the state. In 1957, 87.1% 
of South Dakota's milk production 
was east of the Missouri River. 
Milk production in eastern South 
Dakota has declined in total quan­
tity and in 1958 reached only 70% 
of the 1926-30 average. This de­
crease in quantity has led to excess 
capacity of existing plants and 
probably to increased competition 
between plants for milk and cream. 
Excess plant capacity and increas­
ed competition tend to discourage 
entry of new plants in the area. 
The dairy manufacturing plants 
in this study depended primarily 
on local producers for their supply 
of milk and cream. Six centralizers 
received cream from a large supply 
area through a network of cream 
stations but the remaining 54 plants 
bought all their milk and cream 
directly from local producers. 
Farmers have been changing 
their methods of disposing of milk. 
The amount of milk used on the 
farm, the amount retailed by far­
mers, and the amount separated 
on the farm and sold as cream have 
been decreasing for many years 
( Table 2 ) .  These decreases pave 
Table 2. Percentage Distribution of Milk by Farmers in South Dakota and the 
United States by Selected Year, 1930-1958 
Retailed Delivered to plants and dealers 
Used on farms by farmers as whole milk as cream 
Year S. D. U. S. S. D. U. S. S .D. U. S. S. D. U. S. 
(Percent) 
1930 ---------------------------- 23.0 24.8 3 .9 6.8 2 . 1  34.4 7 1 .0 34.0 
1935 ---------------------------- 24.9 25.7 3 .8 6.9 2 .2 35.2 69. l  32 .2 
1940 ---------------------------- 20 . l  2 1 .2 3.5 5 .6 2 .5 43. l  73.9 30.l 
1 94 5 ---------------------------- 1 8 .5 17 .9 2 .7 4.7 5 .6 57.5 73.2 1 9.9 
1950 --------------------------- 1 7 .3 15 .7 2 .7 3 .4 8.4 63.6 7 1 .6 1 7.3 
1 955 ---------------------------- 1 4.3 1 2 .0 1 .2 2 .2 1 4.3 73.7 70.2 1 2 . l  
1 95 8 ---------------------------- 1 1 .3 1 0.0 1 .0 1 .8 25.4 79.4 62.3 8.8 
Source : Agricultural Statistics, U. S. Department of Agriculture, 1 959, and South Dakota Dairy 
Reporter, S. D. Crop and Livestock Reporting Service, May 20 ,  1959 .  
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been off set by an increase of milk marketed in whole form. This trend has been more pronounced and more advanced in the rest of the nation than in South Dakota. It has been in response to changing consumer demands which favor �ilk and solids-not-fat in milk at the expense of butter and cream, and government price support pro­gr�ms which have favored the sale of nonfat milk solids. This trend to whole milk marketing probably will continue and may be accele­rated in South Dakota. This will have the effect of further decreas­ing the number and importance of cream stations, small creameries, and centralizers while enhancing the competitive advantage of plants receiving whole milk. 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The marketing of manufacturing milk and cream involves many com­plex relationships. An analytical framework is necessary for arrang­ing these relationships in proper perspective for evaluation. Receiv­ed value theory was drawn upon heavily for analytical tools and nor­mative criteria. The analytical framework together with the theory on which it was based are pre­sented here in order that the read­er may make his own interpreta­tions of the subsequent analyses and evaluations. Further, it is hoped that this formulation may be useful in other empirical studies. 
Defi nition of Terms 
Market Structure The term "market structure" re­fers to the aggregate of market 
characteristics which influence the conduct of buyers and sellers in the market. Mason has stated that mar­ket structure "includes all those considerations which he takes into account in determining his busi­ness policies and practices" (13, p. 69 ) .  Sosnick uses "structure" to refer to "characteristics which constitute a market's patterns, status, and composition" (19, p. 386). 
The term "market structure" is used here to mean the aggregate of those market characteristics which significantly influence the nature of buyer and seller conduct and the performance of the mar­ket. The market structure concept does not include everything that may influence conduct and perfor­mance. It is restricted to charac­teristics which are peculiar to a particular market and are related to the conduct of buyers and sel­lers with respect to the transaction process. 
Ma rket Behavior 
Market behavior includes the conduct of the buyers and sellers in the market and the performance of the market. The conduct of buy­ers and sellers includes their mar­keting strategy, tactics, and prac­tices. Conduct can also be defined as any action taken by a buyer or seller to maintain or improve his profit position via demand, supply, and cost functions. The five gen­eral categories of conduct are: (1) price practices, (2) quasi-price practices, (3) non-price practices, ( 4 )  unethical practices, and ( 5 )  adoption of technology. Price prac­tices refer to maintaining or im-
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proving one's profit p o s i t i o n through price manipulation. Quasi­price practices differ from price practices only by degree. Included are practices such as absorption of hauling costs, and rebates or re­funds that can readily be given a monetary value but are not a part o'f the explicit product price. 
Non-price practices refer to per­sonal, goodwill, locational, and product differentiation. By unethi­cal practices is meant any practice considered unethical by the buyers and sellers in the market. 6 
The performance of a market includes the market results. Bain said that "Market performance re­fers to the composite of end results in the dimensions of price, output, production costs, selling cost, prod­uct design, and so forth . . .  " (1, p. 11). Sosnick refers to performance as "dimensions which represent the realization of normatively signifi­cant 'economic' results" ( 19, p. 387 ) .  Criteria of performance are nor­mative. The criteria selected for this study were that the marketing system should: (1) reflect consu­mer demand relative to quantity, quality and kind of goods produced, (2) reflect producer demand rela­tive to services offered, (3) be efficient relative to known tech­nology, and (4) be progressive in the development of new products and techniques of production. 
Ma rket Power 
Market power is the ability of a seller or buyer to influence mar­ket behavior. There are two as­pects of market power. The ability of one seller to affect the behavior 
of another seller ( or bu\yer 1Jis-a­vis another buyer ) is called "power relations." The ability of a seller group to affect the market behavior of a buyer group (or vice versa) is called "balance of power." 
Power relations among sellers or buyers may be classified as (1) iso­lated, (2) atomistic, (3) circular, ( 4) mixed, and (5) complex. Iso­lated power relations exist when there is only one seller in a given market. Atomistic power relations exist if no seller in a market group affects or is affected by the actions or reactions of the other sellers when making an output or selling policy decision. Circularity exists, between sellers, when either seller can affect the other's volume by changing price. Mixed power re­lations exist when there are both atomistic and circular relations within the same group or when there are assymetrical relationships such as "dominant-seller oligopoly." Complex power relations involve direct and indirect circularity. They are typical of spatially separated sellers or buyers of imperfectly sub­stitutable products, that is, of spa­tial differentiation and "chain" com­petition. 
The balance of power between buyer and the seller groups tends to favor the group with the more concentrated market power. It is related to the three general types of price determination: (1) price setting - if market power is un­equally divided between buyers and sellers, the more powerful 
0The buyers and sellers in the market will, 
hereafter, be referred to as the "market 
group." 
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group tends to set the terms of 
trade; (2) price bargaining - if 
market power is equally divided 
between the two groups, the terms 
of trade tend to be determined by 
either individual or collective bar­
gaining; and (3) price fixing - if 
market power is extremely concen­
trated and the public interest in­
volved, the terms of trade may be 
regulated by a governmental agen­
cy. Scitovsky has pointed out that 
"Trade at set prices is the most 
common form of market relations 
in our society" (18, p. 21). 
Market Relationships 
Structu re and Behavior 
Some economists feel that mar­
ket structure at least influences 
and possibly determines the con­
duct and performance of a mar­
ket. The classical models of per­
fect competition and monopoly 
both implied that market behavior 
was a function of market structure. 
A perfectly competitive structure 
was supposed to result in a perfect­
ly efficient marketing system that 
equated supply and demand and 
transmitted consumers' tastes to 
producers through the price sys­
tem, whereas monopolies were 
thought of as inimical to the ideal 
performance of the market. Schum­
peter claimed that the classicists 
neglected the development of new 
technology as a performance norm 
and that perfect competition was 
incompatible with research and 
technological development. He fur­
ther argued that innovation came 
from monopoly power (17, pp. 83-
85). 
The recognition of an area be · 
tween perfect competition and mo­
nopoly has caused economists to 
re-evaluate the cause-and-effect re­
lationship between structure and 
l::ehavior. Firms in the area of im­
perfect competition are not the 
passive participants of the market 
that characterized the perfect com­
petition model. When firms com­
pete in small groups the action of 
each exerts a marked influence on 
the position of the others. Each 
firm adjusts itself to a given mar­
ket structure but is also capable 
of changing that structure. Hefle­
bower says that "the structure of 
a market at a given time reflects 
an evolutionary process whereby 
firms come to acquire a workable 
relationship with one another" (11, 
p. 124). 
The structure of a market can 
reflect mistakes, conscious moves, 
or past conditions. Consequently, 
firms may be larger or smaller than 
conditions of supply or cost would 
warrant. The original structure of 
the dairy marketing system was 
influenced by attributes of the 
product such as perishability and 
bulkiness in relation to the level 
of technology at the time of devel­
opment. These are now built into 
the structure. 
Structure a nd Power 
Market power, also, is related 
to market structure. In a perfectly 
competitive market the individual 
seller or buyer would have no mar­
ket power while a monopolist or 
monopsonist facing many buyers 
or sellers would have a maximum 
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amount of market power. For all market structures between perfect competition and monopoly the market power of sellers and buyers is less clear cut. 
Measurement of Market Power 
Hypothetically, power relations among buyers can be determined through the use of cross influence of supply schedules. It is difficult, if not impossible, to collect data which can be substituted directly into a cross influence schedule. The concept, however, guides the in­vestigator to other tools of measure­ment which may approximate the results obtained if data were avail­able. The measuring tool used in this study to identify the direct rivals of each plant and to measure market power was to ask each plant manager the following ques­tion: Which plant or plants do you watch most closely in setting your prices? It was assumed that each plant manager watched the prices of his direct rivals. The answers to this question did not give a complete picture of di­rect rivalry and market power be­cause the answers did not include all competitive relationships. The question only referred to price com­petition. and plants could and did compete on other bases. Also, the answers' did not reveal dormant but potential competitive relation­ships. The modal number of plants that plant managers watched in setting prices was two. The modal size of the direct rivalry group, therefore, was three ( Figure 4 ) .  In addition to delineating the 
direct rivalry group for each plant, the answers to this question also revealed the n u m b e r of plants which looked to each other for price information. This resulted in an index of market power for each plant. The index of market power was calculated by counting the number of plants which looked to a particular plant for price informa­tion.7 
PROCUREMENT POLICIES 
AND PRACTICES 
(CONDUCT) 
The objectives of the procure­ment policies of the 60 dairy man­ufacturing plants included in this study were to acquire a certain and regular supply of milk with desired quality attributes. The a­mount and quality of milk and cream received by each plant were determined by (1) the density of milk production in the plant's sup­ply area, (2) the plant's procure­ment policy, and (3) the procure­ment policies of the plant's direct rivals. Under these conditions an 
�ndividual plant's volume and qual­ity of purchase would be influen­ced by the management's choice of price, quasi-price, and non-price services offered to the producers. 
Buying Strategies 
Price Price competition refers to that aspect of economic rivalry in which 
';The data did not include plants in sur­
rounding states which secured price in­
fonnation from South Dakota plants. The 
market power of some of the border 
plants probably was grealter than thi,s 
study indicated. 
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Figure 4. Sources of price information of 59 dairy manufacturing plants in eastern 
South Dakota, 1958. Arrows point to the plant from which price information 
was received. 
two or more buyers seek given vol­
ume and quality objectives by 
means of the price paid for milk 
and cream at the time of purchase. 8 
Dairy producers in South Dakota 
had, on the average, two or three 
outlets for their product. The mar­
ket structure was characterized by 
relatively few buyers in each di-
rect rivalry group and many sel­
lers. The buyers were the price 
makers and this made necessary 
some type of pricing policy. The 
most common pricing policy of the 
8Cash patronage refunds and absorption 
of hauling costs were considered as quasi­
price competition. None of the plants al­
located its reserves to patrons accounts. 
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dairy manufacturing plants was average pricing w i t h localized price leadership. 
The managers of 49 of the 56 plants buying cream considered their competitors' prices when de­termining their own prices. The managers of 17 of these 49 plants _set prices only on the basis of what their competitors paid and the re­maining 32 managers considered both manufactured product prices and competitors' prices in their own purchase price determination. Sev­en plant managers reported that they considered only product pri­ces in the determination of their own purchase price but four of these seven managers did watch the prices paid by their competi­tors. 
Of the 49 plant managers who watched competitors' prices, 39 re­ported a policy of paying the aver­age of their competitors' prices.9 Six plants had policies of paying above the average. Five of these six plants were non-integrated plants and they tried to keep their prices above their competitors' prices to offset the cash patronage refund paid by the producer-inte­grated plants.1° Four plant mana­gers reported policies of paying less than their competitors and all f o u r �ere producer-integrated plants. These answers were veri­fied by the average prices actually paid for cream during 1955, 1956, and 1957. The average price paid by the producer integrated plants at the time of purchase was 58.46 cents per pound of butterfat in cream whereas the non-integrated plants paid an average purchase 
price of 60.2 cents or 1.74 cents 
more than the integrated plants. The non-integrated plants used price to offset the quasi-price and non-price practices of producer­integrated plants. 
The pricing of milk was quite similar to the pricing of cream. 
Six plant managers reported set­ting prices on the basis of only their competitors' prices, n i n e plant managers set prices on the basis of both competitors' prices and product prices, and eight plant managers reported that they only considered product prices. Five of these eight managers, however, did watch the prices paid by their com­petitors. Of the 15 plant managers who considered competitors' prices in their own price det�rmination, 13 had policies of paying the aver­age of their competitors' prices, one above the average, (a non-in­tegrated plant), and one below the average. Again their answers were verified by the price data for 1957 which showed that the average of purchase prices for milk paid by 
0It was not determined whether plants cal­
culated a simple average, a weighed 
average, or paid the same price as their 
highest paying direct rival. This short­
coming does not, however, impair the use­
fulness of the results as they are used in 
this context. 
10Dairy plants were classified into ( 1 ) pro­
ducer integrated and ( 2) not producer 
integrated. They will he referred to as 
producer integrated and non-integrated 
plants. The distinguishing characteristic 
was that the producer integrated plants 
returned excess earnings to the producer 
on the basis of patronage while the non­
integrated plants returned excess earn­
ings to the stock owners. 
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the non-integrated plants was $2.90 per hundredweight while the aver­age of prices paid by producer­integrated plants was $2.85. These findings agree with the Wisconsin study which found that "the most frequently stated price policy was that of average pricing. Out of 62 instances reported upon, 49 listed it" (5, p; 15) . 
The most common method of obtaining price information was by telephone. Forty-two plant mana­gers found what other plants were paying by calling the plant mana­gers. With the exception of dis­tant centralizers and cases where plant managers could not get a­long with each other, the telephone was almost the exclusive method of keeping informed on prices. Prices of manufactured dairy prod­ucts were quite stable so managers did not have to keep in daily touch with each other but telephoned their competitors only when a change in prices was considered. 
Other price practices were more difficult to imitate than the basic price paid for butterfat in milk and cream. The practice of paying a premium for bulk milk could not be duplicated, by plants not buy­ing bulk milk. Ten plants bought bulk milk and nine of them paid a premium. The most common pre­mium was 10 cents per hundred­weight paid by six plants. Two plants paid 15 cents and one plant 5 cents per , hundredweight. Some of the managers admitted that these premiums were not justified on the basis of present savings in costs but felt they would be , justi­fied when all the milk was re-
ceived by bulk. The premium was explicitly thought of as an encour­agement toward an all-bulk opera-, tion. None of the managers ment­ioned it as a competitive tool to attract producers from other plants. Many managers, however, reported going into bulk because they were losing their best patrons to other plants which were in bulk. 
Price at the time of purchase was generally not utilized as a strategic device for increasing vol­ume of dairy processing plants in eastern South Dakota. The greater efficiency of large producer-integ­rated plants over smaller non-in­tegrated type plants was not passed on to , producers in the form of a higher purchase price for butterfat but rather in the form of absorption of hauling costs and patronage re­funds. Non.:.integrated plants paid a higher average purchase price than producer-integrated plants but this was a constant differential used to offset the p�tronage re­fund paid at the end of the year by producer-integrated plants. This conclusion is in accord with the findings of a similar study in Wis­consin which stated that "a much more significant development was the expression of the idea that a­mong certain firms competition was allowed to take only certain forms if it were to be socially acceptable. Among these firms a plant manager might occasionally resort to price competition, but a good neighbor would not. In several instances there was evidence that the plants around here are pretty good neigh­bors" (5, p. 17). 
The findings : of this study and 
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the Wisconsin study are in agree­
ment with economic theory on 
pricing. Galbraith says, "Most im­
portant, where the number of firms 
is small, a characteristic feature of 
modern industry, interdependence 
is recognized and respected, and 
firms stoutly avoid price behavior 
which would enhance uncertainty 
for all" (10, pp. 100-101). Fellner 
,9bserved in his Competition Among 
the Few that oligopolistic firms 
generally live in a state of quasi­
agreement and the agreement is 
usually confined to prices and not 
to other methods of competitive 
behavior (9, p. 182). 
The small number of plants in 
each direct rivalry group leads to 
circular power relations and inter­
dependence of price policy. The 
circular power relations within each 
direct rivalry group minimizes pur­
chase price as a competitive weap­
on. The interlocking of direct rival­
ry groups encompasses the entire 
market and renders unstable any 
plan among firms to lower purchase 
prices collusively. '.J'he local price 
leader does not possess sufficient 
market power to effectuate lower 
purchase price but rather acts as a 
reflector of market conditions. 
The inability of plants, with cir­
cular power relations, to use price 
effectively as a competitive weap­
on and the difficulty of collusion 
among all . the pla,nts in the. mar­ket enhances the value of ·quasi­
price and non-price tactics as com­
petitive weapons. 
Quasi-price 
Quasi-price practices included 
plant absorption of hauling costs 
and payment of patronage refunds. 
Thirty-nine of the 56 plants buy­
ing cream had truck assembly ser­
vice for their patrons. This included 
31 of the 34 producer-integrated 
plants and eight of the 22 non-in­
tegrated plants. Thirty-six of the 
39 plants paid all the hauling 
costs, two plants shared the haul­
ing costs with the producer, while 
only one plant absorbed none of 
the hauling cost. Most of the plants 
did not have accurate assembly 
cost figures so they were asked to 
estimate these costs. The most com­
mon estimate of hauling costs was 
three cents per pound of butter­
fat, the lowest estimate was 2 cents 
and the highest was 5 cents. The 
average estimated hauling cost per 
pound of butterfat assembled by 
truck was 3.27 cents. This average 
was weighed according to the vol­
ume of butterfat receipts of each 
plant. 
The relative burden of absorb­
ing hauling costs was greater for 
the 1 a r g e r plants than for the 
smaller plants because the larger 
Table 3. Average Absorption of Hauling 
Costs of Cream by Volume of Receipts 
for 51 Dairy Manufacturing Plants in 
Eastern South Dakota, 1958* 
Volume of rece:pts 
No. of Absorption of 
plants haulingcosts 
Cents per lb. 
of butterfat 
Lbs. of butterfat in cream 
Less than 250,000 __________ 25 1.44 
250,000-499,999 ------------ 1 3  1 .95 
500,000-999,999 ------------ 1 0  3 .02 
1 ,000,000 and over_______ 3 2.80 
*The centralizers were omitted from this classi­
fication because they d id not receive cream 
directly from producers. 
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plants received a greater propor­
tion of their cream through truck 
assembly (Table 3) . The 38 plants 
which received less than 500,000 
pounds of butterfat had an average 
hauling cost absorption of 1 .62 
cents and the 13 plants which re­
ceived 500,000 pounds of butter­
fat and over had an average ab­
�orption of 2.97 cents per pound 
df butterfat in cream. 
Absorption of hauling costs was 
relatively uncommon in the pur­
chase of milk. Three plants out 
of 22 absorbed the entire hauling 
cost, five plants shared the cost 
with the producer. The eight plants 
absorbed, on the average, 24.2% of 
the cost. The other 14 plants did not 
pay any of the hauling cost. 
One of the nine plants receiving 
bulk milk for manufacturing pur­
poses absorbed the hauling cost 
of bulk assembly. The other eight 
did not pay any of the assembly 
costs. 
Cash patronage refunds consti­
tuted another type of quasi-price 
practice. Refunds were paid in one 
or more of the three years studied 
(1955, 1956, and 1957) by 26 of 
the 34 producer-integrated plants 
buying butterfat in cream. The 
highest average refund for the 
three years was 6.3 cents per pound 
of butterfat in cream and the aver­
age refund paid, for the three years 
by the 26 plants, was 3.65 cents. 
The savings from the greater ef­
ficiency of the large producer-in­
tegrated plants were generally pas­
sed on to the patron in the form of 
a refund. The nine producer-inte­
grated plants which received less 
than 250,000 pounds of butterfat 
a year paid an average refund of 
1 .52 cents per pound of butterfat 
in cream and the three producer­
integrated plants that received over 
1 ,000,000 pounds paid an average 
annual refund of 5.49 cents (Table 
4) . 
Eight plants receiving milk paid 
a refund in 1957. The refunds rang­
ed from 4.5 cents to 21 cents per 
hundredweight of milk and the 
average of the eight plants was 
12. 1  cents per hundredweight. 
Table 4. Average Refund by Volume of 
Receipts for 33 Producer-Integrated 
Dairy Manufacturing Plants in Eastern 
South Dakota, 1955-57* 
Receipts, 
volume 
Plants, Refund, 
number average 
Cents per lb. 
Lbs. of butter of butterfat 
Less than 250,000 _________ 9 1 .52 
250,000-499,999 ----------- 12 2 .98 
500,000-999,999 ------------ 9 3 .23 
1 ,000,000 and over________ 3 5 .49 
*One plant was excluded from these figures 
because the greater part of its cream was pur­
chased from cream stations rather than direct­
ly  from producers. 
Four plant managers reported 
that the payment of patronage re­
funds by their rivals was the pro­
curement practice which gave them 
the most trouble. Many of the 
plants usually paid their annual 
refunds in December and the far­
mers tended to rely on this source 
of income for Christmas shopping. 
In such cases, producers may tend 
to overvalue rather than discount 
patronage refunds. 
Non-Price 
Non-price practices include aux­
iliary services and other procure-
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merit practices not classified as managers were not questioned as 
price or quasi-price practices. In- to the cost of this service but an 
sofar as these factors, whether real estimate of four cents per hundred­
or fancied, vary from plant to plant, weight of milk was made on the 
the plants are differentiated in the basis of cost data from four Wis­
eyes of the sellers and they develop consin plants (6, pp. 25-26). 
preferences among the various Twenty-seven of the 56 plants 
plants: These preferences reduce buying cream paid all the cost of 
producers' responses to price and retinning cream cans, 26 plants did 
quasi:price practices. not pay any of the cost, two plants 
Fifty-three of the 56 plants fur"' paid one-half of the cost and one 
nished cans to cream ' patrons. plant paid the cost if the patron 
Twenty-seven of these plants did could talk the manager into it. 
not charge for the cans (Table 5). Forty-two of the 59 plants sold 
1, dairy supplies at the plant: 13 sold 
tr'able 5. Classification of 53 Dairy Man- these supplies at cost while 29 
Ufacturing · Plants in Eastern South plants sold at cost plus a markup. 
Dakota by Method of Pricing Cream Other supplies such as feed and Cans to Patrons, 1958 fertilizer were sold by 22 plants 
Number and all of these plants sold at cost 
_M_et_h_od_._of_p_ri_c:_,n_g ______ _  of_p_la_nts plus a markup. These supplies may 
No charge ---------------------------------------- 27  be handled as  a service to the 
At cost --------------------------------------------- 1 7  patron or as a means to increase 
Cost plus a markup________________________ 7 the plant's profit. It is reasonable 
Plant buys every other can ______________ 2 to assume, however, that a patron 
Total ------ ------------------------------------------ 53 would be a more loyal cream or 
The practice of providing free cans 
to patrons was not as prevalent for 
milk and only seven of the 22 
plants buying, manufacturing milk 
used this practice (Table 6). The 
Table 6. Classification of 22 Dairy Man­
ufacturing Plants in Eastern South 
Dakota by Method of Pricing Milk Cans 
_to Patrons, 1958 
Method of pricing 
Number 
of plants 
No charge -------------------------------------·-- 7 
At cost ________ ------------------------------------- 6 
Cost plus a markup________________________ 2 
Plant buys every other can ______ c_______ 2 
Plant rents cans to patrons ______________ 5 
T 9.t�d 0 __ .. ---"--------------------------------------- 22 
milk supplier if he also purchased 
his feed, fertilizer, or dairy sup­
plies at the same plant. 
Furnishing buttermilk or whey 
to the patrons was a common prac­
tice. Forty-four of the 56 plants 
manufacturing b u t t e r  furnished 
buttermilk to patrons but only 
three plants did not charge for 
it. The other 41 plants charged 
a nominal price. Three of the five 
plants manufacturing cheese fur­
nished whey to the patrons and 
all three plants gave it away. 
The managers of 41 of the 42 
plants that provided assemblr ser­
vice reported that their haulers ad­
vised the patrons on quality prob­
lems and the haulers of 17 plants 
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advised the patrons on production 
problems. The haulers of all 42 
plants delivered dairy or farm sup­
plies to patrons and four plant 
managers reported that their haul­
ers would deliver groceries to pa­
trons on special request. 
A more significant, but less com­
mon practice, was the making of 
loans to patrons. Eight plants made 
direct loans to patrons. Five of 
these lent for the purpose of pur­
chasing can coolers for milk. They 
deducted the payments from the 
milk checks. This seemed to be 
a method of converting cream pa­
trons to milk patrons. 
Cosigning notes for patrons and 
taking the payments out of the 
cream or milk check was a com­
petitive practice of nine plants. The 
larger producer-integrated plants 
were more prone to utilize this 
practice as four of the seven pro­
ducer-integrated p 1 a n  t s handling 
milk cosigned notes for the pur­
chase of bulk tanks and two other 
producer-integrated plants cosign­
ed notes for can coolers. Two non­
integrated plants engaged in this 
competitive practice. 
Loaning money to patrons or co­
signing a patron's promissory note 
was an effective method of holding 
a patron and rendering the patron 
less sensitive to price or service 
differentiation. A similar practice, 
which has been started by two or 
three plants since this study was 
completed, is a lease arrangement 
for bulk tanks. The lease arrange­
ment has the same effect as a mar­
keting agreement with a single 
plant and probably binds the pa-
trons closer to a given plant than 
does a cosigned ;note. 
Only two plants in . southeast 
South Dakota maintained contact 
with the patrons through a news­
letter. The Wisconsin study . found 
that this was a common competi­
tive device, but the plants included 
in that study were much larger 
( 5, p. 32 ) .  A plant newsletter prob­
ably becomes more _important as a 
competitive tool when plants be­
come larger and the relationship� 
between the plant management and 
the patrons becomes more imper­
sonal. 
Six plants offered group insur­
ance plans for patrons. Five of 
these six were milk receiving phmts. 
The same services tend to be 
adopted by contiguous plants. Th� 
practice of furnishing free .cream 
cans to patrons was followed by 
Figure 5. Location of dairy manufac­
turing plants in eastern SouJh D.akota 
according to method of pricing .�rtam 
cans to patrons, 1958. Circle with . dots 
in center indicates free qfa)Il ,cans; 
plain circle indicates other lileqiod :Pf 
pricing cream cans. 
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81.2% of the plants in the south­east part of the area while only 16.7% of the plants in the north­west section of the area followed this practice (Figure 5). If the area was divided into an eastern and a western section, it was found that 73. 1% of the plants in the east­ern section and 36.0% of the plants in the western section furnished free cream cans to patrons. The practice of retinning patrons' cream cans without charge was also most common in the southeast district where 75.0% of the plants pro­vided this service to patrons (Fig­ure 6). This service was provided by 65.5% of the plants in the southern section and by 29.1% of the plants in the northern sec­tion of the area. The practice of furnishing and 
Figure 6. Location of dairy manufac­
turing plants in eastern South Dakota 
according to method of pricing retin­
ning of cream cans to patrons, 1958. 
Circle with dot in center indicates free 
retinning of cream cans; plain circle 
indicates charge for retinning. 
retinning milk cans to the patron without charge was concentrated 
Figure 7. Location of dairy manufac­
turing plants in eastern South Dakota 
according to method of pricing milk 
cans to patrons, 1958. Circlctwith dot in 
center indicates free milk cans; plain cir­
cle, other method of pricing milk cans. 
Figure 8. Location of dairy manufac­
turing plants in eastern South Dakota 
according to method of pricing retin­
ning of milk cans to patrons, 1958. 
Circle with dot in center indicates free 
retinning of milk cans; plain circle indi­
cates charge for retinning of milk cans. 
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in the northeast section of the state. (Figures 7 and 8). Two cheese manufacturing plants in this area have provided this ser­vice so when the neighboring but­ter manufacturing plants started receiving milk they also adopted these two services. The practice has not, however, spread beyond this area. 
Some services offered by plants can be provided at little or no cost to the plant. Examples of these were the services provided by haul­ers, such as advising patrons on quality and production problems, and delivering farm supplies or groceries to patrons. Other services that cost very little were selling supplies at cost price, cosigning notes, publishing a newsletter or offering group insurance. Some ser-
vices, such as providing free cans, retinning cans free, and having a quality fieldman, cost more and must be paid from an increased processing and marketing margin. The p 1 a n t s, in continuing these services, may have felt that these services were a more effective way to increase and stabilize volume than to eliminate the services and pay a higher price. There are two advantages to competing on a ser­vice rather than on a price basis. First, the direct rivals are more sensitive to changes in price and can retaliate faster and also are more likely to meet the price change thus nullifying the effects of a price change. Forty-nine of the 56 plants buying cream reported a deliberate policy of paying a price relative to rivals and 15 of 
Table 7. Li.st of Auxiliary Services and Service Score Assigned to Each Service 
Name of service Service score 
Haulers advise patrons on production problems _____________________________________ _ 
Haulers advise patrons on quality problems ---------------------------------------------
Haulers deliver farm supplies ____________________________________________________________________ _ 
Haulers deliver groceries ________________ ____________________ -------------------------------------- ___ _ 
Plant furnishes cans without charge __________________________ ________________________________ 5 
Plant furnishes every other can without charge ________________________________________ 2 
Plant furnishes cans at cost__ ________________________________________________________________________ I 
Plant retins cans without charge _______________________________________________________________ 5 
Plant retins every other can without charge --- ------------------------------------------ 2 
Plant furnishes dairy supplies at cost -------------------------------------------------------- I 
Plant furnishes buttermilk to patrons at nominal charge________________________ I 
Plant gives buttermilk to farmer with no charge _____________________________________ 2 
Plant furnishes whey to patrons at no charge ----------------------------------------- 2 
Plant makes loans to patrons ______ _________________ �--------------------------------------------- 5 
Plant cosigns notes for patrons---------------------------------------------------------"------ 3 
Plant publishes a newsletter_______________________________________________________________________ I 
Plant offers group insurance ______________________________________________________________________ I 
Quality fieldman-full time _____________________________________________________________________ _ 5 
Quality fieldman-one-half time _______________________________________________________________ __. 2 
Quality fieldman-less than one-half time ----------------------------------------------- -I 
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the 23 plants buying milk priced it relative to rivals. Second, the development of producer prefer­.ences by service differentiation tends to reduce producers' sensi­tiveness to price and leads to mar­keting habits and inertia on the part of the patron which tends to stabilize the volume of a plant. Five plants had full time quality fieldmen and 16 other plants had quality fieldmen on less than a full time basis. The auxiliary services were as­signed points based on their ap­parent usefulness relative to reach­ing the volume goals of the plant management (Table 7). These ser­vice scores are somewhat arbi­trary and their significance should be interpreted with caution. How­ever, some sort of service score technique was necessary to reduce the complex of services to manage­able proportions. The service scores were summed for each plant to obtain a rough index of the mag­nitudes of auxiliary services pro­vided. 
Unethical Practices 
Concepts of fair competition and unfair competition are employed frequently in connection with com­petitive practices. Such concepts are usually based on ethical con­sideratiqns and on the common practice§ of the trade. Attempts have been made by law to define and eliminate unfair competition. The National Recovery Act (NRA) provided "codes of fair competi­tion," many states have passed a "fair trade law," and the Federal Trade Commission makes rulings on unfair competition. 
No attempt was made in this study to define "unfair" and "un­
ethical" competition. Each plant 
manager was asked: Do you con­sider any of your competitors' prac­tices unethical? What are they? Do you feel that competition has forced 
you to use similar practices? If so, which ones and why? 
Thirty-one of 59 plant managers considered one or more of their 
competitors' practices "unethical." Thirteen managers felt that their competitors' testing practices were "unethical," ten managers felt that their competitors' grading stand­ards were "unethical," and four managers mentioned their competi­tors' weighing methods as "unethi­cal" (Table 8). 
It is evident that some managers 
tended to regard as "unethical" any 
Table 8. Number of Eastern South Da­
kota Dairy Manufacturing Plant Man­
agers Reporting Certain Competitors' 
Practices as Unethical, 1958 
Type of practice 
No. of plant 
managers 
reporting 
practice as 
unethical 
Manipulation of test___ ____________________ 13 
Irregular grading____________________________ 10 
Irregular weighing_________________________ 4 
Differential pricing_________________________ 3 
Pay too high a price_______________________ 3 
Spread false rumors_______________________ 3 
Do not agree on price______________________ 2 
Cooperatives do not pay income tax 1 
Assembling milk by truck in an-
other plant's territory* ______________ _ 
*The plant that listed this practice was not re­
ceiving milk. 
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competitive practice that hurts them. Some practices which were listed as "unethical" were only 
changes in the status quo and are necessary competitive practices for 
a dynamic dairy marketing system. 
Three managers reported that they had been influenced by com­petition to adopt similar "unethi­
cal" practices . The three "unethi­cal " practices were ( 1 )  loose grad­ing of cream, (2) manipulation of test, and (3) paying a higher price than the product was worth. 
Most of the practices which the managers considered unethical were aimed at destroying competition and thus lessen the efficiency of the price system ih allocating re­sources according to consumer de­mand. These practices are inimical to the interests of both consumers and producers. The manipulation of tests, weights, and grades makes it possible for an inefficient plant to compete on a price, quasi-price, and service basis with a more ef­ficient direct rival. Competition as a stimulus to efficiency is thus thwarted and the inefficient plant continues to live under the um­brella of unfair practices. These same unfair practices mitigate the efficiency of competition in pro­tecting various economic groups against exploitation. They make it possible to exploit sellers as a group to the benefit of the buyer. They also make it possible to exploit one group of sellers to the benefit of another group. Differential pricing between patrons is another form of exploitation of one patron vis-a-vis another patron. 
Weighing and Testing 
The most common practice in weighing cream was to round the weight to the nearest pound with the plant taking any weight up to 
and including the half-pound and 
giving any weight over the half­pound. Forty-four of the 56 plants followed this method and one ad­ditional plant took any weight up to three-quarters of a pound. Elev­en plants buying cream dropped all fractions of a pound. There was no major difference between pro­ducer-integrated and non-integrat­ed plants in the method of weigh­ing cream, 79.5% of the producer­integrated and 77.2% of the non-in­tegrated plants rounded the cream weights to the nearest pound. The 11 plants that took all tenths up to the next pound were somewhat smaller than the average plant as they had an average 1957 butterfat receipts of 432,181 pounds com­pared to an average of 552,433 for all plants in this study. The six pro­ducer-integrated plants that follow­ed this practice had an average 1957 butterfat volume of 555,583 pounds compared to 284,116 for the non­integrated plants. The 11 plants that followed this practice paid an average total price of 63.40 cents per pound of butterfat compared to the same average price, 63.40 cents, for all plants in the study. 
Rounding pounds of milk to the nearest pound was also the most common method of weighing milk as 14 out of 22 plants used this method. E i g h t plants dropped tenths of a pound in weighing milk. Six of these plants were producer-
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integrated and two were non-inte­grated plants. The producer-inte­grated plants which followed this practice, from which price informa­tion was available, paid an average price of $3.04 per hundredweight of milk compared to an average price of $3.03 for all non-integrated type plants. 
The managers of 45 of the 56 plants buying cream reported that in testing cream they rounded the test to the nearest whole or frac­tional percentage. There was no marked difference between pro­ducer-integrated and non-integra­ed plants in the method of testing, 82.4% of the producer-integrated plants and 77.2% of the non-inte­grated plants read fat tests to the nearest whole or fractional percent­age. Eleven plants dropped all frac­tions of a percent in reading fat tests. The average 1957 volume of these 11 plants was 397,893 pounds of butterfat which was below the average of 552,433 pounds for all plants but the average total price of 63.77 cents per pound of butter­fat paid by these 11 plants was slightly above the. average price of 63.40 cents paid by the 56 plants. Assuming an average cream test of 30.5% . butterfat, a plant that dropped all fractions in testing cream would receive 1 .6% more butterfat than it paid for. If this advantage was paid out in the form of higher prices, this plant could pay 1 .01 cents more per pound of butterfat based on butter­fat price of 63.40 cents. The fact that the 11 plants which followed this practice were smaller than average but paid a slightly higher 
than average price may indicate that this testing method was being used to enable the plant to pay a higher butterfat price. In the case of the producer-integrated plant paying an agreed purchase price, this increment would in­crease the annual refund. 
Nineteen of the 22 plants buy­ing milk rounded milk tests to the nearest tenth of one percent and three plants dropped milk tests to the next lowest tenth. 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
STRUCTURE AND CONDUCT 
Market structures often are des­cribed in terms of a few major elements which are believed to account for most market behavior. The elements which are mt:>h com­monly discussed are number of firms, size of firms, differentiation, and ease of entry and exit. The complex behavior of the market for manufacturing milk and cream cannot be explained adequately in such simple terms. Eight structural elements were identified that seem­ed to have a significant influence on the behavior of the market. These were product characteristics, service characteristics, numbers of buyers and sellers, size of buyers and sellers, spatial characteristics, integration, degree of knowledge, and ease of entry and exit. 
Some of these structural elements may also be viewed as conduct. The structure of the market re­flects past conduct or past con­ditions that have become institu­tionalized into the present struc­ture and which influence present 
,) 
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behavior. Sosnick says that "struc­
ture and conduct overlap because 
certain events can usefully be view­
ed as patterns in some contexts and 
processes in others" (19, p. 387). 
Product Cha racteristics 
The characteristics of milk and 
cream affect the nature of compe­
tition among plants and the bal­
ance of power between the plant 
and the producer. Whole milk and, 
to a lesser extent, cream are both 
bulky and perishable. They can be 
shipped long distances or stored 
for long periods of time only at 
a high relative cost. These char­
acteristics influence the location of 
milk production so that areas near 
centers of population produce fluid 
milk while areas further from the 
population centers, such as South 
Dakota, produce milk for manu­
facturing purposes. These charac­
teristics, in conjunction with the 
level of processing and procure­
ment technology known at the time 
of plant construction, account for 
the spatial distribution of plants 
within the area of production. 
Raw milk, because of its perish­
ability, does not lend itself to be 
sold on an offer and acceptance 
basis but must be sold on a pre­
arranged pricing or pooling basis. 
The low relative value of a can of 
milk or cream also influences the 
method of sale of milk and leads 
to prearranged pricing agreements 
and the acceptance by the seller 
of a price taker role rather than 
the role of a price bargainer. 
There are objective standards 
for measuring both quantity and 
quality of milk and cream. How­
ever, adequate weighing, testing, 
and grading equipment is relatively 
expensive and few producers can 
afford to own and operate such 
equipment. This places most of 
them at a disadvantage, particu­
larly in testing and grading, be­
cause they have little opportunity 
to check the figures of the plants. 
Notable exceptions are members of 
dairy herd improvement and cow 
herd testing associations. The un­
equal balance of power between 
the plant and the producer makes 
it possible for the plant to use 
its weighing, testing, and grading 
procedures to compete with more 
efficient plants on a price or non­
price basis. Thirteen plant mana­
gers asserted that other plants use 
test manipulation to gain volume, 
ten managers asserted irregular 
grading by rival plants and four 
managers asserted irregular weigh­
ing. These beliefs may make mana­
gers less prone to utilize price as 
a competitive weapon because 
they recognize that their price ad­
vantage can be thwarted by test, 
grade, and weight manipulation. 
Producers also recognize the posi­
bility of weight, test, and grade 
manipulation which r e i n f o r c e s  
their proclivity to sell to people 
they "know" and "can trust." This 
factor also tends to lessen price 
competition and the Wisconsin 
study inferred that fieldmen en­
courage this distrust by attempting 
to convince the farmers that prices 
average out and by questioning 
the operation of high paying plants 
(6, p. 52). 
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Service Characteristics 
The basic service rendered by 
dairy plants to producers is pur­
chasing milk and cream. Nicholls 
said that "a general class of <ser­
vices' is differentiated, if any sig­
nificant basis exists, in the minds 
of the sellers, for preferring the 
services of one buver over those 
of another" (14, p. 198) . The basic 
purchasing service may be differ­
entiated by location, method of 
assembly, and goodwill. Locational 
differentiation will be discussed 
under the rubric of spatial char­
acteristics. 
Milk and cream were delivered 
to the receiving stations or plants 
by the producers ( stage 1 )  until 
the advent of the truck. Some buy­
ers then provided an assembly ser­
vice. Assembly service has been 
further differentiated into cream 
assembly, ( stage 2 )  milk assembly 
by cans ( stage 3 ) ,  and milk assem­
bly by bulk ( stage 4 ) .  The plants 
in each stage of assembly have a 
procurement advantage over the 
plants in the preceding stage be­
cause producers tend to switch 
from hauling their own cream, to 
plant assembly of cream, to plant 
assembly of milk by cans, to plant 
assembly of milk by bulk. Produc­
ers seldom reverse the direction of 
this trend so plants using a more 
advanced assembly method can 
raid patrons from plants using a 
less advanced method with less 
fear of retaliation. The plants which 
assembled milk by bulk had an in­
dex of market power of 3.00 com­
pared with an index of 2.07 for 
plants assembling milk by can and 
an index of 1.07 for the plants 
which received only door delivered 
cream (Table 9). 
An assembly service encouraged 
the addition of auxiliary services 
such as delivering farm and dairy 
supplies, and advising the patron 
on production and quality prob­
lems. The 14 plants with no assem­
bly service had an average auxil­
iary service score of 2.5 compared 
to a service score of 10.8 for all 
plants providing an assembly ser­
vice. 
The marketing of milk, in East­
ern South Dakota at the time of 
this study included stages 1, 2, 3, 
and 4. The 1957 butterfat receipts 
in cream and milk were obtained 
from 55 of the 60 plants in Eastern 
South Dakota. The receipts of the 
remaining five plants were esti­
mated. 
The estimated amount of milk 
or milk equivalent received by the 
60 plants in 1957 was 915,533,900 
Table 9. Average Indexes of Market Power by Type of Assembly Service f�r 60 
Dairy Manufacturing Plants in Eastern South Dakota, 1957 
Numberof Index of 
Type of assembly service Stage plants market power 
No assembly service __________________________________________________ 1 
Cream assembly by cans __________________________________________ 2 
Milk assembly by cans ______________________________________________ 3 
Milk assembly by bulk__ ____________________________________________ 4 
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pounds (Table 10). Farmers deliv­
ered 43.3 percent of the milk or 
milk equivalent to the creamery 
or cream stations in the form of 
cream ( stage 1 ) .  Contract and plant 
owned trucks assembled 35.9% of all 
milk or milk equivalent marketed as 
cream. 
The 1957 data did not distin­
qui!sh milk received in bulk from 
milk received in cans. Consequent­
ly, stages 3 and 4 could not be 
separated. It was found that 20.8% 
of milk or its equivalent was mar­
keted in these two stages. Plants 
in Eastern South Dakota first re­
ceived milk in cans and bulk in 
November and December of 1955 
and by 1957 about one-fifth of all 
milk or milk equivalent was mar­
keted through this medium. 
Managers of plants receiving 
bulk milk were called in June, 
1959, and estimates were made of 
percentage of all milk received in 
bulk. According to these estimates, 
18% of all milk marketed in East­
ern South Dakota in June, 1959, 
was marketed as bulk and 33% 
of milk marketed to plants handl­
ing both can and bulk milk was 
marketed as bulk milk. 
Goodwill is the relationship 
which develops between buyer and 
seller as a result of public relations 
activities, personal contact with the 
manager, owner, or agent of a 
plant and past policies and practi­
ces of a plant. 9oodwill constitutes 
a nexus that d.es producers to a 
specific plant even though other 
plants may be paying a higher 
price or offering more . auxiliary 
services. In a business where "fud­
ging" on weight and test is a com-
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monly suspected practice, produ­
cers may feel it is important to 
deal with people they know and 
feel they can trust. 
Producers become paired with 
plants simply by reason of service 
differentiation. Each plant has, 
therefore, a partial monopsony rel­
ative to a certain group of its pa­
trons for as long as the plant con­
tinues to operate. If this group is 
not large enough to insure ade­
quate volume, and it seldom is, 
the plant is subject to competition 
from other plants offering more or 
less imperfectly substitutable ser­
vices. This competition sets a limit 
upon the exploitation of the plant's 
"own" clientele because the plant 
pays the same price to all patrons. 
If a plant pays a price lower than 
its direct rivals, it will lose· those 
patrons whose preferences for that 
plant are least strong. It is the pro­
ducers who are responsive to price 
and service differentiation who 
cause circular interdependence a­
mong direct rivals. 
Numbers of Buyers and Sellers 
The numbers of buyers and sell­
ers in a market are usually con­
sidered to be the main determi­
nant of market power. A large 
number of buyers will find them­
selves in an atomistic relationship 
if no single buyer can significantly 
affect the purchases of another buy­
er through a change in price or 
services offered. A small number 
of buyers tends to have a con­
centration of control of enterprise 
activity within the market. This 
generally results in circular power 
relations because each buyer rec-
ognizes the interdependence be­
tween himslf and his rivals. The 
relative numbers of buyers and sell­
ers in the market influence the 
balance of power between the buy­
ers and sellers. The balance of 
power tends to favor the side with 
fewer firms because the concen­
tration of control is usually greater 
on that side. 
In 1957, there were 2,062 plants 
in the United States engaged in 
butter manufacturing, 1,194 in 
cheese manufacturing, 3,395 in ice 
cream manufacturing, and 1,654 in 
c o t t a g e cheese manufacturing. 
These plants bought milk and 
cream from approximately 750,000 
producers. In South Dakota, 60 
plants purchased milk and cream 
for manufacturing purposes from 
approximately 32,000 producers. 
These plants were inter-related 
through a network of interlocking 
direct rivalry groups. The power re­
lations among plants were neither 
atomistic, which the large number 
of plants would suggest, or simply 
circular which the small number 
of plants in each direct rivalry 
group would suggest. The power 
relations among these plants were 
complex - involving both direct 
and indirect circularity. This will 
be discussed in detail in the sec­
tion on spatial characteristics. 
The size of each direct rivalry 
group was compared with prices 
paid by plants within the group 
to determine if the amount of com­
petition within the group influenc­
ed the prices paid. The small num­
ber of firms in each direct rivalry 
group indicated that the power re­
lations, within each group, were 
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circular. The size of the direct 
rivalry group was compared with 
the total prices paid for cream, by 
the plants in the group1 1  (Table 
11). The highest average price of 
65.20 cents per pound of butter­
fat was paid by the plants which 
only had one plant in their direct 
rivalry group. The three plants in 
this category reported that they 
set prices only on the basis of prod­
uct prices and did not watch any 
other plants when setting the price. 
The lowest average price of 62.62 
cents per pound of butterfat was 
paid by plants which had four 
plants in their direct rivalry group. 
There was no definite indication 
that the size of the direct rivalry 
gr�up influenced the prices paid. 
Table 1 1. Average Total Price Paid for 
Butterfat in Cream by Size of Direct 
Rivalry Group for 37 Dairy Manufac­
turing Plants in Eastern South Dakota, 
Size of direct 
rivalry group 
1955-57* 
Number Av. pricet 
of plants cents per lb. 
1 plant ________________________ 3 65.20 
2 plants ________________________ 8 63 .57 
3 plants _______________________ 7 63.27 
4 plants ________________________ 1 0  62 .62 
5 or more plants __________ 9 63.58 
*Only 37 plants gave information on prices 
paid to producers for butterfat in cream. Only 
plants buying cream directly from producers 
were included in this table. Plants buying 
through cream stations were omitted because 
their cost of butterfat figures included the 
commission paid to the cream station operators. 
tThe average prices are simple rather than 
weighed averages. 
The size of the direct rivalry 
group was compared with the ser­
vice score (Table 12). There was 
no consistent relationship between 
the size of the direct rivalry group 
and the services offered as measu­
ured by the service score. 
Table 12. Average Service Score by Size 
of Direct Rivalry Group for 56 Dairy 
Manufacturing Plants in Eastern South 
Dakota, 1957 
Size of direct 
rivalry groups 
Average 
Number service 
of plants score 
1 plant __________________________ 5 8.20 
? plants __________________________ 1 4  7 . 14  
3 plants __________________________ 15  7.87 
4 plants __________________________ 1 1  9 .64 
5 plants and over___ _______ 1 1  9.27 
Sizes of Buyers and Sellers 
Size, in this context, is largely 
a matter of the degree of finan­
cial strength. The financial strength 
of individual buyers or sellers can 
be measured by net worth, total 
assets, plant capacity, net earnings, 
or volume of sales and purchases. 
These are not good criteria, how­
ever, of the financial strength of 
a multiple-unit organization. Some 
of the dairy plants in Eastern South 
Dakota were owned by large cor­
porate chains and their financial 
strength was not limited by these 
characteristics of the individual 
plants. 
1 1Total price inc�uded price paid at the 
time of purchase, absorption of hauling 
costs by the plant, and patronage re­
funds paid in cash. Absorption of haul­
ing cost was calculated by multiplying 
the percentage of milk or cream volume 
receipts by the ar1ount of hauling cost, 
per unit of milk or cream, absorbed by 
the plant. 
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Net Worth 
The 32 p r o d u c e r-integrated plants, which gave net worth information had a combined net worth, in 1957, of $2,789,000 for an average net worth of $87,156. Correlation . of plant size, on the basis of net worth, showed that the larger plants paid a higher aver­age price to producers than the smaller plants (Ta,ble 13) . There was a definite break in the prices paid between plants above and be­low a net worth of $100,000. This was probably because the plants with greater financial resources were better able to adopt . cost re­ducing technological changes than the plants with less financial re­sources. 
Table 13. Average Total Price Paid for 
Butterfat in Cream by Net Worth for 25 
Producer-Integrated Dairy Manufactur­
ing Plants in Eastern South Dakota, 
Net worth, 
dollars 
1957* 
Av. total 
price paid 
for butterfat 
Number in cream, 
of plants cents per lb. 
Less than 50,000 ____________ 9 63.54 
50,000-99,999 ---------------- 8 63.53 
1 00,000-1 49,999 ------------ 3 65.64 
150,000-1 99,999 ------------ 3 65.89 
200,000 and over___ _______ 2 65 .96 
*Complete price information was received from 
only 25 of the 32 integrated plants. 
The average index of market power was .69 for the 13 plants with a net worth of less than $50,000 and increased with each larger level of net worth ( Table 14) .  The two plants with a net 
worth over $200,000 had an aver­age index of market power of 6.0. Financially strong plants have more firmly entrenched competitive po­sitions and would be better able 
Table 14. Average Index of Market 
Power by Net Worth for 32 Producer­
Integrated Dairy Manufacturing Plants 
in Ea.stern South Dakota, 1957 
Net worth, 
dollars 
Average 
index of 
Number market 
of plants power 
Less than 50,000 ____________ 1 3  .69 
50,000-99,999 --------------- 1 0  1 .80 
1 00,000- 149,999 ------------ 3 2.00 
150,000- 1 99,999 ----------- 4 4.25 
200,000 and over __________ 2 6.00 
to defeat a weaker plant in a "price war." Price wars are seldom used as tools of competitive strat­egy but the fear of a price war influences the decisions made by the management of financially weaker plants. Some of the direct rivals of the two centralizers which were owned by large multi-plant corporations were well aware of their disadvantageous financial po­sition and the managers reported that they "kept in line" with the price paid by the centralizer rather than risk a price war. 
Volume of Receipts 
Butterfat receipts for 60 plants varied from 29,000 to 3,100,000 pounds in 1957 and averaged 522,433 pounds. Comparison of vol­ume of receipts with total prices for butterfat in cream indicated that the larger volume plants paid, on the average, a higher total price 
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Table 15. Average Prices Paid for Butterfat in Cream by Size of Plant for 26 
Producer-Integrated Dairy Manufacturing Plants in Eastern South Dakota, 1 957 
Payment for butterfat in cream 
Volume of butterfat 
receipts, lbs. 
Number Purchase Absorption of Patronage Total 
of plants price hauling costs refund price Difference 
Less than 250,000 __________ 6 
250,000-499,999 ------------ 1 0  500,000-999,999 ------------ 2 
1 ,000,000 and over________ 3 
58.55 
58.59 
58.64 
57.39 
than the smaller volume plants 
(Table 15). Only producer-inte­
grated plants were included in this 
analysis so price differences due 
only to differences in volume could 
be determined. The volume of re­
ceipts did not influence the price 
paid producers at the time of pur­
chase, indicating that p u r c h a s e  
price was not a means by which 
large and small volume producer­
integrated plants competed. The 
large volume plants absorbed a 
greater share of the hauling costs 
and paid a larger cash patronage 
refund than the smaller volume 
plants. The overall price advantage 
to a producer to sell his cream to 
a plant receiving over a million 
pounds of butterfat annually rather 
than to a plant receiving less than 
250,000 pounds averaged 2.77 cents 
per pound of butterfat for produc-
(cents per pound) 
2.09 2.27 62.9 1 
1.99 3.58 64. 16  
3.29 3 . 19 65. 12  
2.80 5 .49 65.68 
er-integrated plants. 
+ 1.25 
+.96 
+.s6 
Comparison of volume of re­
ceipts with total prices paid for 
milk indicated that, with the ex­
ception of one plant receiving less 
than 250,000 pounds of butterfat 
annually, volume of receipts had 
very little if any influence on total 
prices paid (Table 16). 
Comparison of volume of re­
ceipts with service scores indicated 
that the most services were offered 
by plants receiving less than 250,-
000 pounds of butterfat annually 
(Table 17). Many of the services of­
fered cost little or nothing to the 
plant and the low volume plants 
may have felt that they could bet­
ter afford to compete on a service 
rather than on a price basis. 
It was found that the larger 
plants utilized higher levels of tech­
nology (Table 18). No plants re-
Table 16. Average Prices Paid for Milk by Size of Plant for 1 1  Producer-Integrated 
Dairy Manufacturing Plants in Eastern South Dakota, 1957 
Payment for milk 
Volume of butterfat 
receipts, lbs. 
Number Purchase Absorption of Patronage Total 
of plants price hauling costs refund price 
Less than 250,000 ___________ 1 
250,000-499,999 -------------- 3 
500,000-999,999 -------------- 5 
1 ,000,000 and over__ ________ 2 
2.66 
2.88 
2.89 
2.79 
( dollars per hundredweight) .07 2.73 
.08 .06 3.02 
.05 .09 3.03 
. 15  . 10  3.04 
Difference 
+.29 
+.0 1  
+.0 1 
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Table 17. Average Service Score by Size of Plant for Producer-Integrated Dairy 
Manufacturing Plants in Eastern South Dakota, 1957 
Cream patrons Milk patrons 
Volume of 
butterfat receipts 
Number Average Number Average 
of plants service score of plants service score 
Less than 250,000______________________________ 9 
250,000-499 ,999 -------------------------------- 1 2  
500,000-999,999 -------------------------------- 9 
1 ,000,000 and over____________________________ 4 
1 0.33 
8 .75 
9 .33 
7.78 
2 
6 
8 
2 
13.50 
9.83 
8.75 
12.50 
Total ------------------------------------------ 34 1 8  
ceiving less than 250,000 pounds 
of butterfat annually used bulk 
tank procurement while_ the per­
centage utilizing bulk tanks in­
creased to 16% for plants in the 250,-
000-499,999 pounds of butterfat 
bracket, to 33% in the 500,000-999,-
999 pound bracket, and to 50% in the 
over 1,000,000 pound bracket. 
The c o m p a r i s o n of volume 
of receipts with the index of mar­
ket power showed that market pow­
er increased as the volume of re­
ceipts increased (Table 19). The 
26 plants that receiYed less -than 
250,000 pounds of butterfat in 1958 
had an average index of market 
power of .42. The index increased 
to 1.15 for the plants in the 250,000 
-499,999 pound category, to 2.08 
for plants in the 500,000-999,999 
pound category while the eight 
plants that received over one mil­
lion pounds of butter-fat had an 
average index of 4.62. 
Spatial Characteristics 
S p  a t  i a 1 characteristics are in­
volved in the locational distribu­
tion of buyers and sellers. Milk 
and cream are produced on -widely 
scattered farms and assembled in­
to central plants for processing. The 
costs of assembling the products 
are such that plants tend to be 
located separately, each procuring 
from the area adjacent to it. Dis­
tance affects: (1) the knowledge 
which a producer has about prices 
and services, (2) the confidence 
which producers have in a plant's 
Table 18. Percentage Distribution of 35 Producer-Integrated Dairy Manufacturing 
Plants in Eastern South Dakota According to Size of Plant and 
Level of Technology, 1958 
Level of technology* 
Volume of receipts 2 3 4 
(Percentage of plants) 
Less than 250,000______ ________________ 1 0  70 20 
250,000-499,999 ------------------------ 17 33 33 
500,000-999,999 ------------------------ 0 1 1  56 
1 ,000,000 and over___________________ 0 50 0 
0 
1 7  
33 
50 
Total 
1 00 
1 00 
1 00 
1 00 
*Level I ,  door delivered cream ; 2, cream assembled by truck ; 3, milk assembled by truck ; 4, milk 
assembled in bulk. 
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w e i g h i n g, testing, and grading practices, and ( 3 )  transportation costs from producer to plant. Spatial differentiation results in complex power relations among buyers. The market group of buy­ers of manufacturing milk and cream includes thousands of spa­tially separated plants. Each plant has some control over price in buy­ing and is, therefore, a price maker. The plant manager, as a price mak­er, takes into consideration the ac­tions and reactions of his direct rivals so the power relations within each direct rivalry group are cir­cular. The effects of changes made by a plant's indirect rivals are trans­mitted through the direct rivals so the effects are generally attributed to the direct rivals. Indirect rivals are generally ignored in making decisions although a circular power relationship exists because of the overlapping of d i r e c t  rivalry groups. The power relations among indirect rivals were "indirect circu­lar." The power relations, in a mar­ket with both direct and indirect circular power relations, are termed "complex". Complex power relations severe-
Table 19. Average Indexes of Market 
Power by Size of Plant for 60 Dairy 
Manufacturing Plants in Eastern South 
Volume 
of butterfat 
receipts, lbs. 
Dakota, 1958 
Average 
Number index of 
ofplants marketpower 
Less than 250,000 ________ 26 .42 250,000-499,999 --------- 13 1 . 15 500,000-999,999 ---------- 13 2.08 1 ,000,000 and over______ 8 4 .62 Total ________________________ 60 1 .52 
ly limit collusion among independ­ent buyers. An agreement to de­press prices w o u 1 d be difficult. However, each plant has a small range within which it can modify price because of pairing of patrons 
and plants due to service and spa­tial differentiation. 
The limitation upon price manip­ulation for plants with complex power relations leads the plant 
management to differentiate its buying by means of services to sell­
ers. The services of plants in such a market are, by the nature of the market, spatially differentiated so buyers and sellers are not paired at random. Additional differentia­tion of the products or services al­lows the plant further maneuver­ability in price decisions. Complex power relations are conducive to swift movement of price changes, rapid adoption of new technology unless artificial restrictions inter­fere with its adoption, and strong preference for competitive prac­tices other than price. 
The spatial distribution of plants also results in "ties" between the farmers and the community where the plant is located. In many com­munities the dairy manufacturing plant was the largest employer and was the "life blood" of the commu­nity. Farmers may feel a respon­sibility toward the local plant or may feel an implicit guilt emanat­ing from "what the neighbors may think" if they sell to an outside plant. 
Local businessmen are also anx­ious to keep the creamery going 
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and in three communities capital 
had been raised from local busi­
nessmen and farmers to form local 
stock companies to buy out the 
local plant which was shutting 
down. These local companies were 
not organized to return profits to 
capital owners but only to keep 
the plant in operation. When cer­
tain farmers feel such a respon­
sibility to local communities they 
become somewhat insensitive to 
differences in price or service a­
mong plants. However, the ties be­
tween a producer and a local com­
munity are probably weakened by 
the existence of assembly services. 
The distribution of market power 
is closely related to spatial distri­
bution. It may be concentrated in 
local areas despite "large" numbers 
of "small'' firms in the group as a 
whole. A plant's possession of us­
able market power depends upon 
its relative isolation. If it has a 
large procurement area, a large 
part of which is free from rivalry 
of other plants, it may be able to 
utilize a great deal of its power 
in dealing with producers. In prac­
tice, no plant has unlimited mar­
ket power because of the over­
lapping of procurement areas and 
the threat of other plants expanding 
into their procurement area. A 
large discrepancy in the relative 
terms of trade may encourage 
other large plants to expand into 
an area. Assembly costs are not 
directly proportional to distance 
and it is possible to haul milk con­
siderable distances at low cost 
once a truck has been loaded and 
on a good highway. 
Integration 
Two of the usual simplifying 
assumptions in price theory are 
that each firm is a single plant 
operation and that it is completely 
vertically integrated so that pro­
ducers sell directly to the consu­
mers. In reality, there are various 
degrees of horizontal and vertical 
integration in different markets and 
often within a given market. An 
organization that is i n t e g r a t e d 
either horizontally or vertically is 
able to shift and concentrate its 
market power in certain geograph­
ical areas or in certain stages of 
the distribution process. The mar­
ket power of an integrated organi­
zation is more effective because 
it is more mobile. 
Integration was quite common 
among the dairy manufa<?turing 
plants in South Dakota. Thirty-five 
plants were producer-integrated. 
These plants represented hori­
zontal integration in the form of 
collective action by producers and 
vertical integration of the producer 
to the processor level. These organ­
izations cannot be classified as true 
buyers although they did take le­
gal title to the products they hand­
led. They were agents of their 
member producers and as such 
they represented them in process­
ing the raw material and selling the 
finished product to wholesalers and 
other buyers. 
The previously discussed "rela­
tive number of buyers and sellers" 
becomes less meaningful when 
most of the plants are producer­
integrated. The relative bargain­
ing p o w e r  of producers was 
strengthened in those areas served 
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by integrated plants whether they 
actually patronized the integrated 
plant or not. The presence of an 
integrated plant tended to limit 
the market power of the non-in­
tegrated or profit-type plant. 
In addition to the 35 producer­
integrated plants, two plants were 
owned by large multi-plant corpo­
rations and were horizontally in­
tegrated operations. The market 
power of these plants was respect­
ed by their direct rivals because 
of their greater financial resources. 
The market power due to greater 
financial resources is magnified by 
integration. An integrated organi­
zation has greater market power 
than a non-integrated plant of 
equal financial resources because 
it can make profits at one plant 
or one stage of offset losses at 
another plant or stage of the dis­
tribution system. For purposes of 
analysis, these two plants were in­
cluded in the non-integrated group 
to distinguish them from the pro­
ducer-integrated plants. 
Type of Plant 
The analysis in this section in­
cludes only the 34 producer-integ­
rated and 23 non-integrated plants 
which manufactured butter. The 
34 producer-integrated plants re­
ceived 19,309,144 pounds of but­
terfat in 1957 for an average of 
567,916 pounds per plant. The 23 
non-integrated p 1 a n  t s received 
10,440,341 pounds of butterfat for 
a per plant average of 453,928 
pounds. If there are economies of 
scale in manufacturing butter, the_ 
difference in volume of receipts 
between a producer-integrated and 
a non-integrated plant should in­
fluence prices paid to producers 
for butterfat. This conclusion was 
supported by price information 
collected in this survey for the 
years 1955, 1956, and 1957 (Table 
20) . Producer-integrated p 1 a n  t s  
paid an average total price of 64.31 
cents per pound of butterfat com­
pared to 61.26 cents paid by the 
non-integrated plants. 
The range of total prices paid 
by producer-integrated plants was 
from 60.41 cents to 66.67 cents per 
pound of butterfat, ·and 80.8% 
of the integrated plants paid an 
average price within two cents 
of the mean. The _ range of - total 
prices paid by the non-integrated 
plants was greater, ranging from 
57.29 to 66.39 cents per pound of 
b u t t e r f  a t, and 54.5% of the 
T�ble 20. Price and Quasi-Price Payments for Butterfat in Cream by 37 Eastern 
South Dakota Dairy Manufacturing Plants by Type of Plant, 1955, 1956, and 1957 
Type of plant 
Producer-integrated Non-integrated 
Number Av. price Number Av. price 
of plants cents per lb. of plants cents per lb. 
Average price at time of purchase __________ 26 
Absorption of hauling cost__ ____________________ ___ _ 
Patronage refund ( cash )-------------------------- ___ _ 
Total prices --------------------------------------------- ___ _ 
58 .46 
2 .45 
3 .40 
64.3 1 
1 1  60.2 0 
1 .06 
6 1 .26 
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non-integrated plants paid an aver- chased cream had an average ser­age price within two cents of the vice score of 9.06 and the 22 non­mean. This indicated either a integrated plants had an average greater variablity in the processing score of 6.41. Measured on an costs of non-integrated plants vis- equivalent volume of receipts basis a-vis producer-integrated plants or the nine producer-integrated plants that s o m e non-integrated plants that received less than 250,000 capitalized on greater profit oppor- pounds of butterfat in cream an­tunities. To eliminate, as far as pos- nually had an average service score sible, variabilities in processing of 10.33 as compared with a ser­costs due to volume of receipts, vice score of 7.5 for the 16 non­only the plants which received less integrated plants in this category. than 250,000 pounds of butterfat This study showed that the pro­annually were considered.12 The ducer-integrated plants were more average total price paid by the prone to adopt new technology producer-integrated plants in this than non-integrated plants. Eight category was 62.92 cents per pound of the 16 non-integrated plants of butterfat which was 1. 76 cents with less than 250,000 pounds of more per pound of butterfat than butterfat volume in 1957 received the average total price of 61.16 only door delivered cream while cents paid by the non-integrated only one of the 10 producer-inte­plants. Furthermore, all six of the grated plants in the same category producer-integrated plants paid a received only door delivered cream. price within a range of their mean Seventy percent of the producer­plus or minus one cent and only integrated plants assembled cream four of the ten non-integrated by truck while 44% of the non­plants prices fell within a range integrated plants were at this level of their mean plus · or minus one of technology. cent. The range of Brices paid by the non-integrated plants was from An analysis of the market power 57.29 cents to 66.39 tents per pound of the 60 plants in the survey show­of butterfat. Jt seems reasonable ed than the non-integrated plants to conclude that plants receiving had, on the average, less market less than 250,000 pounds of butter- power than the producer-integrat­fat per year had similar cost struc- ed plants. The average index of tures and some non-integrated market power of the 35 producer­plants were able to capitalize on integrated plants was 1.91 as com­greater profit opportunities by pay- pared to an index of .96 for the 25 ing a lower price to producers. non-integrated plants in the survey. The average index of all the plants In addition to paying a higher was 1.52. Ten out of 35 producer-average total price the producer- _ _  _ integrated plants buying cream pro- 12This category of volume of receipts was 
selected because ten out of eleven non-vided, on the average, more ser- integrated plants were in this category, vices to producers. The 34 pro- There were six producer-integrated ducer-integrated plants that pur- plants in this category. 
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integrated plants and 15 out of 25 
non-integrated plants had an index 
of market power of zero13 (Table 
21). With the exception of three 
centralizers, all non - integrated 
plants had an index of market 
power of two or less while 68.57% 
of the integrated plants had an 
index of two or less. 
Degree of Knowledge 
The importance of "degree of 
knowledge" as a structural element 
is the influence it has on the bal­
ance of power between buyers and 
sellers. The general level of know­
ledge among buyers and sellers 
was not measured in this study. 
A similar study in Wisconsin found 
that "with few exceptions, mana­
gers knew which firms were pay­
ing highest and lowest · prices in 
the area. There seemed to be great 
price information among firms" 
(5, p. 27). Plant managers are bet­
ter informed for several reasons: 
(1) they are trained to observe 
certain criteria of market behavior, 
(2) it is easier for them to obtain 
relevant information, (3) it is cus­
tomary for managers to exchange 
price information regularly, (4) 
they understand and have facili­
ties to measure technical relation­
ships, and (5) dairying is a side­
line to most producers, so they do 
not try to keep themselves well 
informed about dairy marketing 
conditions. P r o d u c e r s generally 
have inferior knowledge about 
prices and other relevant factors. 
Even if a producer should know 
that one plant has a higher quoted 
price than another, he probably 
does not know how their hauling 
charges, value of miscellaneous 
services, or their weighing-testing­
grading practices compare. 
Another Wisconsin study report-
18An index of market power of zero indi­
cated that at the time the study was 
made no plant looked to that particular 
plant when making price decisions. An 
index of zero does not mean that a plant 
does not have any market power-it does 
indicate that the plant was not exer­
cising any power at the time the sched­
ules were taken. 
Table 2 1 .  Classification of All Dairy Manufacturing Plants in Eastern South Dakota 
by Index of Market Power and Type of Plant, 1958 
Type of plant 
Index of Producer· integrated Non-integrated Total 
market Number Cumulative Number Cumulative Number Cumulative 
power of plants percentage of plants percentage of plants percentage 
0 ---------------- 10  28.57 15 60.00 25 4 1 .67 
1 ---------------- 1 0  57. 14  5 80.00 1 5  66.67 
2 ---------------- 4 68.57 2 88.00 6 76.67 
3 ---------------- 3 77. 1 4  0 88 .00 3 81 .67 
4 ---------------- 5 9 1 .43 1 92.00 6 9 1 .67 
5 ---------------- 1 94.29 1 96.00 2 95.oo· 
6 ---------------- 0 94.29 1 1 00 .00 1 96.67 
7 ---------------- 1 97. 1 4  0 1 98.33 
8 --------------- 1 100 .00 0 1 1 00.00 
Total ---- 35 25 60 
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ed that "opinions of sellers about 
milk weights and tests tended to 
bind them to their buyers and dis­
courage changing to other firms. 
In general, sellers believed they 
obtained accurate tests and weights 
from the firms to which they cur­
rently sold milk but they suspected 
or were uncertain as ' to the accur­
acy of the tests and weights given 
by alternative buyers. . .Such sus­
picion or uncertainty discourages 
sellers from changing to another 
firm"' (4, p. 20). Another impor­
tant consideration is patronage re­
funds. A _ producer may know the 
p�st --record qf a plant for paying 
refunds, but he is very unlikely 
to ·know what the current earnings 
situation is and what magnitude 
of price adjustment he may ex­
pect, if :any. 
The degree of knowledge is in­
terrelated with the number of firms 
o� ·each side of the market. Scitov­
sky mentioned that one of the con­
ditions of price setting is the inex­
pertness on one side of the mar­
ket which is characteristically the 
side of. large numbers ( 18, p. 19 ) .  
The efforts of the United States 
Department of Agriculture, state 
agencies, newspapers, radio sta­
tions, and various producers' associ­
ations help consideraply to inform 
producers. A dairy farmer who ac­
tively seeks to be informed may 
have as much knowledge about 
the market as do most managers. 
However, the fact remains that 
most managers are far better in­
formed than most producers. This 
serves to increase the balance of 
power favoring the buyers. It is 
also true that the better informed 
managers have a competitive ad­
vantage over their less well in­
formed rivals. Many managers were 
promoted from technical jobs to 
management. They lack both for­
mal education and business train­
ing, and they do not know how 
to obtain the information they need 
or how to use what they have. 
Market power tends to be increas­
ed by better knowledge. 
Ease of Entry and Exit 
The ease of entry of new firms 
into a market affects the market 
behavior of the existing firms in 
the market. The possibility of en­
try of new firms into a market 
group is a source of competitive 
pressure. This pressure limits the 
advantages that price makers can 
derive from their market positions. 
Papandreou and Wheeler say 
that the threat of entry is greatest 
when "a firm can become a mem­
ber of a group on terms which are 
at least as favorable as those which 
are available to the firms which 
make up the group in question" 
(15, p. 177).14 They listed five 
types of restrictions on entry. They 
were: (1) terms on which tech­
nological data and technologies are 
made available, (2) terms on which 
factors of production are made 
available, (3) terms on which out­
lets for the product are made avail­
able, ( 4) consumer allegiances, and 
(5) outright legal restrictions (15, 
p. 179). Using these criteria as a 
standard, new dairy manufactur­
ing plants entering a market group 
would find: (1) the methods of 
14The pertinent group in a market with 
spatial competition would be the direct 
rivalry group. 
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assembly and processing widely 
known and freely available to new­
comers, ( 2 )  their manufactured 
products could be sold as readily 
as the existing plants' products, 
(3) no consumer allegiances to the 
major proportion of its product, and 
( 4) no legal restrictions. The new 
plant would, however, be at a dis­
advantage in raw material procure­
ment. It was found that producers' 
a 1 1  e g i a n c e s build up through 
the years so producers tend to be 
paired with certain plants on the 
basis of goodwill and locational 
preferences. T h e s e  preferences 
could be broken through paying 
a higher price or offering more 
auxiliary services to producers but 
this raises the cost of the raw ma­
terials over what the existing plants 
in the group must pay. 
Other factors which limited the 
entry of new plants into the area 
of study were the declining pro­
duction of milk in South Dakota 
and the larger optimum scale of 
existing plants. These factors have 
led to a declining number of dairy 
manufacturing plants in South Da­
kota over the past three decades. 
The number of plants in the 
unit of study was decreasing so 
the ease of exit is, currently, a 
more pertinent element of struct­
ure than ease of entry. Ease of 
exit is contingent upon the oppor­
tunity to find alternative uses for 
the investment in land, buildings, 
and equipment. Plants unable to 
liquidate these assets at a reason­
able price or unable to use them 
for . other purposes are likely to 
continue in operation as long as 
variable costs are covered. 
Most of the dairy manufactur­
ing plants in Eastern South Dakota 
were located in small towns where 
there were few, if any, alternative 
uses for the buildings. The value 
of the building was, in many cases, 
very low in terms of alternative 
uses. Other uses for the equipment 
were limited also. A great part of 
the equipment was technologically 
obsolete and, being highly specia­
lized, had no use outside of the 
dairy industry. As a result of these 
deterrents to exit, plants were not 
leaving the market group fast e­
nough to permit adjustment to 
changing production patterns and 
changing technology in milk pro­
cessing and assembly. The conse­
quences of this "surplus" of dairy 
manufacturing plants was: (1) ex­
cessive overlapping of milk and 
cream assembly routes which lead 
to a misallocation of resources in 
milk and cream assembly, (2) an 
inefficient size processing plant rel­
ative to current technology, (3) 
a relaxation of quality standards, 
and ( 4) an encouragement to use 
unethical practices to stay in busi­
ness. T h e s e three consequences 
were initiated by exit deterrents 
but their realization was made pos­
sible by other structural elements. 
EVALUATION OF MARKET POWER 
AND PERFORMANCE 
Market Power 
Market power is the ability of 
a seller or buyer to influence mar­
ket behavior. Two aspects of mar­
ket p o w e r  were distinguished­
power relations and balance of 
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power. Power relations concern the 
ability of a buyer or seller to affect 
the behavior of another buyer or 
seller on the same side of the mar­
ket. 
Power relations among plants in 
each direct rivalry group were 
found to be circular with varying 
degrees of influence exercised by 
plants within the group. Generally 
speaking, the greatest influence was 
exercised by producer-integrated 
plants receiving both can and bulk 
milk. The least influence was exer­
cised by non-integrated plants re­
ceiving less than 250,000 pounds of 
butterfat per year and receiving on­
ly door delivered cream. In some 
cases the power relations between 
a large and a small plant approach­
ed dominance. As measured in this 
study the apparent influence of 25 
of the 60 plants was nil. However, 
these plants probably had enough 
potential influence to merit classi­
fying their power relations with 
larger plants as circular but with 
the larger plants approaching do­
minance. 
Power relations between a plant 
and its direct rivals were indirect 
circular. Plants were affected by 
the actions of their indirect rivals 
but the effects were transmitted 
through their direct rivals. The re­
actions of indirect rivals to policy 
changes were not considered while 
the reactions of the direct rivals 
were considered. This combination 
of direct and indirect circularity 
was called complex power rela­
tions. 
Plant managers were cognizant 
of the power relations between 
themselves and their direct rivals 
and also of the relative market 
power of their direct and some of 
their indirect rivals. Managers were 
generally aware of what their mar­
ket power enabled them to do and 
what acts would be unwise. 
The 1959 census of agriculture 
reported that 25,075 farms in East­
ern South Dakota had one or more 
milk cows. The South Dakota Crop 
Reporting Service reported 258,500 
milk cows in this 44 county area 
for an average of 10.3 milk cows 
per farm reporting one or more 
cows. 
The power relations among these 
25,075 milk producers were atom­
istic. Each producer was a price 
taker. He could decide how much 
to produce and sell but he had 
to sell at the price offered by the 
plants. Most of the producers in 
the area had two or more alterna­
tive outlets for their milk and their 
choice of outlet was made on the 
basis of price, service differentia­
tion, or auxiliary services offerd. 
The distribution of market power 
heavily favored the buying plants. 
This resulted in price setting by 
plants with producers taking a pas­
sive role in the process. The fac­
tors which enhanced the market 
power of the plants vis-a-vis the 
producers included the bulkiness 
and perishability of the product, the 
differentiation of the buying ser­
vice, the comparatively smaller 
numbers and larger sizes of the 
plants, better knowledge of mar­
ket conditions by plant managers, 
and the relative difficulty for new 
plants to enter the market. The 
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effect of imbalance of power was 
greatly modified by the prevalence 
of producer-integrated plants. 
Ma rket Performa nce 
The performance of the market 
can be evaluated only in light of 
the things producers and consumers 
want the market to do for them. 
The standards of performance set 
up in the study were: The mar­
keting system should (1) reflect 
efficiently consumer demand rel­
ative to quantity, quality, and kind 
of goods, (2) reflect producers' de­
mand for services, (3) be progres­
sive in the development of new 
products and techniques of pro­
duction, ( 4) maximize efficiency 
relative to known technology. 
The relationships among the 
dairy processing plants seemed to 
constitute reasonably w o r k a b  1 e 
competition. The price paid at the 
time of purchase was heavily in­
fluenced by local price leaders and 
was a reflection of market condi­
tions. There was general uniformity 
throughout the area on prices paid 
at the time of purchase but less 
uniformity on total prices paid. 
Some non-integrated plants were 
able to "shade" the total price paid 
because they did not offer assem­
bly service or pay patronage re­
funds. The structure of the mar­
ket, including overlapping supply 
areas and the presence of producer­
integrated plants, limited this price 
"shading" to a few relatively iso­
lated plants which had strong lo­
cational or service differentiation. 
The buyer-dominant b a 1 a n c e of 
p o w e r resulting from imperfect 
knowledge, inertia, and habit on 
the part of the seller also contrib­
uted to "price shading" practices. 
The total prices paid by the plants 
were close to market value of 
finished products less processing 
and marketing costs. They tended 
to reflect consumer demand rela­
tive to quantity, quality, and kind 
of dairy products insofar as they 
were accurately transmitted to 
them by wholesale buyers. 
This study did not test the atti­
tude of producers toward the ser­
vices offered them by the plants. 
Thirty-three of the plants were co­
operatives and in these plants most 
of the decisions relative to adding 
or deleting services were made by 
producer members or their elected 
directors. It seems safe to assume 
that the services offered by coop­
erative plants reflect the wants of 
the producers. In a Wisconsin study 
dairy producers were questioned 
about their knowledge and satis­
faction with non-price services. It 
found that "Patrons generally ap­
proved of the non-price services 
and public relations activities of 
their dairy plants and believed 
that having them stopped would 
lead to little or no increase in the 
prices received for milk" (4, p. 34). 
With the exception of more inten­
sive use of fieldmen, the services 
offered by the plants in the Wis 
consin study were very similar to 
those offered by the plants in this 
study. 
The third and fourth perfor­
mance norms concern the develop­
ment and adoption of technology. 
Technological change is envisioned 
as having three components which 
are (1) changes in techniques of 
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production or processing, (2) chan- thus circumscribe the efficiency of 
ges in economic organization, and the plants in the market group.15 
(3) product changes. Technologi- Certain structural elements in the 
cal change, in each of these com-
ponents, has two phases. The first market under study were condu-
phase is innovational and covers cive to the rapid adoption of tech­
the process by which new tech- nology. The large numbers of 
niques or products are developed . plants in the market deterred collu­
The second phase is the imitation sion by all the plants in the market 
or adoption of the new technology. group. and the interlocking of di-
Th� innovational activity that 
rect nvalry groups rendered collu­
contnb�tes to a progressive dairy �
ion wi�hin a direct rivalry group 
marketmg system is a difficult area meffec_:tive . The interlocking of di­
t� assay. This study was not de- rect nvalry groups also provided signed to measure innovational ac- the mechanism and pressure for 
tivity but general comments are the spread of technology through-
germane. Innovations in techniques out the market. 
of processing are generally made Other structural elements miti­
by equipment supply companies gated the pressure for adopting 
and state and Federal departments technology in order to increase ef­
o.f agriculture and experiment sta-
ficiency. The structure of the mar­
tions. Innovations in economic or- ket made it possible for inefficient 
�anizations are made by process- plants to continue in operation. The 
mg plants, equipment supply com- pairing of plants and producers due 
panies, and experiment stations. In- to service and spatial differentia­
novations in new products are made tion, and the lack of knowledge 
by the larger processing plants in on the part of the producer due 
the . market group and experiment to product and spatial characteris­
stations. It is, therefore, not neces- tics, made it possible for inefficient 
sary for . the dairy manufacturing 
plants to stay in operation even 
plant to mnovate in order to have though they paid a lower total 
a progressive dairy marketing sy- price . These same structural char­
stem. In fact, in most cases it acteristics also made it possible  for 
would be �neconomical for pl;nts :plants to. engage in irregular grad­
to engage m research activities to mg, testmg, and weighing practi­
devise a new processing technique ces . and thus compete on a price 
or new product . basis: The �uspicion of irregular 
The a�option of technology is gradmg, testmg, and w e i g h i n g 
�eflected m the efficiency of plants 
practices seems to have been preva­
m the market. Certain market char- lent enough to mark them as estab­
acteristics such as large numbers lished practices in some plants and 
and atomistic power relations are 1:;Cf. Yal� Brozen ( 3, pp. 239-257 ) on the 
conducive to the spread of tech- determmants of the rate of imitation of 
nology. Other market structures re- technology. Especially read page 244 on 
t d h d the effect of market organization on the ar t e a option of technology and rate of imitation. 
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real problems in the market. 
The structure of the market also 
promoted considerable overlapping 
of assembly routes and this resulted 
in higher assembly costs. The elimi­
nation of overlapping assembly 
routes through some cooperative 
arrangement could lower collec­
tion costs but might also lower the 
market power of the producer vis­
a-vis the plant. This latter short­
coming could be eliminated if most 
of the plants were producer-inte­
grated plants. While greater ef­
ficiency could be achieved in both 
assembling and processing the raw 
product, the existing level of inef­
ficiency was not considered a seri­
ous malfunctioning of the market. 
SUMMARY 
There were 60 dairy plants in 
Eastern South Dakota purchasing 
manufacturing milk and cream di­
rectly from producers in 1957. The 
procurement areas of these plants 
overlapped extensively, forming a 
network of direct competitive re­
lationsips in which each plant was 
influenced directly by a few other 
plants and indirectly by all other 
plants in the market. The direct 
and indirect substitutability of pur­
chasing services indicated that all 
plants in the study, and possibly 
all dairy manufacturing plants in 
the country, were operating in a 
single market. Likewise, the sub­
stitutability of manufacturing milk 
and cream indicated that all pro­
ducers of these products were op­
erating in a single market. 
The dairy plants used various 
strategies to achieve their procure-
ment goals. These were classified 
as price, quasi-price, and non-price 
practices. Few managers u s e d 
price manipulation as a means of 
attracting patronage because of the 
near certainty of immediate retal­
iation. Most managers set prices 
in relation to competitors' prices, 
finished product prices, or both. 
Thirty-nine m a n a g e r s  reported 
that they sought to pay the average 
of their competitors' prices for 
cream and 13 reported that they 
sought to pay the competitive aver­
age for milk. Most managers ex­
changed price information regular­
ly by telephone. They usually noti­
fied neighboring managers before 
making a price change. The num­
ber of plants which looked to each 
plant for price information was 
used as a rough measure of its 
market power. 
Quasi-price practices included 
hauling subsidies and patronage re­
funds. Truck assembly services 
were provided by 39 of the 56 
plants which bought cream and 
all of the 22 plants which bought 
milk. Among the plants which as­
sembled cream, 36 bore the entire 
cost, two shared the cost with pro­
ducers, and only one bore none of 
the cost. Only three of the milk 
plants bore the entire cost of as­
sembly, five shared the cost with 
producers, and 14 bore non of the 
cost. Patronage refunds on cream 
were paid in one or more of the 
years studied (1955, 1956, and 
1957) by 26 of the 34 producer-in­
tegrated plants which made but­
ter. Patronage refunds on milk were 
paid by eight plants in 1957. 
Dairy plants provided a variety 
48 South Dakota Experiment Station Bulletin 497 
of non-price services. Cream cans 
were furnished at no e x p 1 i c i t 
charge by 27 plants and at less 
than the usual retail price by most 
of the others. All of the milk plants 
furnished milk cans and only two 
charged the full retail price. About 
half of the plants paid the costs 
of retinning cans. Most of the as­
sembly truck drivers advised pa­
trons on milk production and prob­
lems relating to quality milk. Less 
common services included making 
loans, cosigning notes, newsletters, 
and group insurance. Each of the 
services was assigned an arbitrary 
value and a total auxiliary service 
score was computed for each plant. 
Thirty-one managers reported 
unethical practices by competitors. 
The most frequently mentioned 
were incorrect testing, grading, and 
weighing. Some pricing practices 
were regarded as "unfair." 
Most managers reported that in 
testing for butterfat they rounded 
to the nearest percent or tenth 
percent. Most rounded to the near­
est pound in weighiQg. It was cus­
tomary to take the lower of two 
points if the reading was halfway 
between them. A few managers 
reported that all fractions were 
dropped in testing and weighing. 
This did not necessarily result in 
any inequity but it allowed them 
to quote a higher nominal price 
then they were actually paying. 
Most of the literature on mar­
ket structure lists the important 
elements of structure as number 
of firms, size of firms, product dif­
ferentiation, and ease of entry and 
exit. Several additional elements 
were found in this study to have 
a significant influence on market 
behavior. Product characteristics, 
such as bulkiness and perishability, 
fundamentally affect the way a 
product is traded. Milk cannot be 
as readily stored or shipped to dif­
ferent marketplaces to obtain bet­
ter terms as can products like wheat 
and corn. Service characteristics 
may cause buyers and sellers to 
become paired. This tends to limit 
"shopping around" for better terms. 
The basic service provided by 
dairy plants-purchasing milk and 
cream-is differentiated by location, 
method of assembly, and goodwill. 
The number of buyers and sellers 
usually is considered a major de­
terminant of market power. How­
ever, power relations among dairy 
plants were not atomistic despite 
their relatively large numbers. 
Some concentration of market pow­
er was made possible by the spatial 
separation of plants which limited 
the extent of direct competition. 
The size of the direct rivalry group 
appeared to have no significant in­
fluence on either prices paid or 
services rendered. The influence 
of numbers seemed to be strongly 
modified by other elements. 
Size of plant (and of firm in 
cases involving multiple-unit organ­
izations) directly influenced mar­
ket behavior. Two measures of size 
were used in this study-net worth 
and volume of butterfat receipts. 
Average prices for cream were di­
rectly related to size. However, 
there was little variation in milk 
prices among size groups. Service 
scores were inversely related to 
size in the case of cream and there 
was no consistent relationship in 
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the case of milk. There was a 
strong positive relationship be­
tween size and market power. The 
plants with net worth of $200,000 
or more had an average market 
power score nine times that of the 
group with less than $50,000 net 
worth. 
The spatial distribution of pro­
ducers and plants strongly influ­
enced market behavior. The plants 
tended to be located separately 
because of the need to assemble 
milk and cream from comparative­
ly large areas in order to achieve 
reasonable economies of scale. As 
a result, each producer had a choice 
between only a few buyers. The 
more distant the location of the 
buying plant, the less the producer 
was likely to know about its prices, 
services, and reliability. The as­
sembly areas of most plants over­
lapped from one to five others. 
Thus, each plant had only a few 
direct rivals and power relations 
among them tended to be circu­
lar. However, the interlocking of 
direct rivalry groups created a net­
work of communication connect­
ing all plants in the market. Con­
sequently, the effects of every 
price change tended to be relayed 
rapidly throughout the system. The 
resultant complex power relations 
largely prevented both independ­
ent action and overt collusion. This 
left only two alternatives-tacit a­
greement or price war. The danger 
of price war caused competitive 
strategies to be focused largely on 
service differentiation. 
The type and extent of integra­
tion had a significant effect on 
market power. Thirty-five of the 60 
plants were classified as producer­
integrated and 25 as non-integrat­
ed. Most of the former were coop­
eratives and most of the latter were 
independents. The average initial 
price paid for cream was lower 
for the producer-integrated plants 
but the total payment, which in­
cluded hauling subsidies and pa­
tronage refunds, averaged about 
5 percent higher than for the non­
integrated group. The producer­
integrated plants also provided 
more auxiliary services to produc­
ers. The average service score for 
producer-integrated plants buying 
cream was 50 percent greater than 
that of the non-integrated plants. 
The average market power score 
for the producer-integrated plants 
was double that of the non-inte­
grated plants. The market power 
of the producer-integrated plants 
was enhanced by the fact that they 
were the agents of the producers. 
This market power tended to be 
used for the benefit of the pro­
ducers because the interests of the 
producers and their plants were 
similar. 
The degree of knowledge affect­
ed the balance of power between 
buyers and sellers. No objective 
measure of knowledge was at­
tempted in this study but plant 
managers obviously were better in­
formed about the dairy market than 
were most producers. Ease of entry 
and exit also influenced market be­
havior. The chief barriers to entry 
for new plants were the high fixed 
capital requirements and the pair­
ing of producers with existing 
plants. It would have been very 
difficult for a new plant to obtain 
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adequate volume in most areas. 
The exit of dairy plants was cur­
tailed for the same reasons. The 
high fixed investment in highly 
specialized equipment permitted 
plants to remain in operation for 
years despite net operating losses. 
The optimum size of dairy plants 
has grown much faster then the 
rate of plant exit. Consequently, 
most plants were operating far be­
low capacity. Efforts to obtain 
greater volume led to excessive 
overlapping of procurement areas, 
slowness in adopting new technol­
ogy, sacrifice of quality, and en­
couragement to engage in unethical 
procurement practices. 
It was concluded that power re­
lations among buyers were com­
plex-directly circular b e t w e e n  
plants within a direct rivalry group 
and indirectly circular between 
plants in different rivalry groups. 
The degree of market power was 
related to level of technology, size, 
and type of plant. Power relations 
among producers were found to be 
atomistic. The balance of power 
strongly favored the plants. How­
ever, the prevalence of producer­
integrated plants and the efficient 
communication of competitive for­
ces throughout the market tended 
to lessen the imbalance of market 
power to a marked degree. 
It was further concluded that 
the relationships among d a i r y 
plants constituted reasonably work­
able competition. Prices paid seem­
ed to reflect market conditions. The 
overlapping of procurement areas 
undoubtedly had an adverse effect 
on procurement costs but, coinci­
dentally, it gave producers more 
choices among buyers and it tend­
ed to inhibit overt collusion. Ap­
parently, the services provided to 
producers reflected their wants. 
The development of new technolo­
gy seemed fairly progressive al­
though little of it was done by the 
plants or producers. The rate of 
adopting new technology seemed 
reasonably rapid although barriers 
to exit encouraged many technic­
cally inefficient plants to remain 
in operation. 
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